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Article 
Restructuring Rebuttal of the Marital 
Presumption for the Modern Era 
Jessica Feinberg†  
  INTRODUCTION   
The marital presumption of paternity, which arose from 
English common law, has served as a core component of the law 
governing parentage in the United States since the nation’s in-
ception.1 Pursuant to the marital presumption, a husband is pre-
sumed to be the legal father of any child born to or conceived by 
his wife during the marriage.2 Historically, the marital presump-
tion was extremely difficult to rebut, generally requiring proof of 
the husband’s non-access to his wife during the time of concep-
tion, the husband’s sterility or impotence, or adultery on the part 
of the wife.3 As these early grounds for rebuttal made clear, a 
husband was deemed the legal parent of a child born to or con-
ceived by his wife during the marriage unless it was proven that 
the husband could not possibly be the child’s biological father. 
Today, the question of whether a biological tie exists between the 
husband and child, which can now be accurately resolved 
through simple DNA testing procedures, continues to be a core 
consideration in actions to rebut the marital presumption.4 The 
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 1. See infra Part I.A. 
 2. Theresa Glennon, Somebody’s Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Mar-
ital Presumption of Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 547, 562 (2000). 
 3. Id. at 565. 
 4. See infra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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nationwide legalization of same-sex marriage, however, calls 
into question the future of the marital presumption, and, in par-
ticular, the future role that genetics-based considerations will 
play in the application of the marital presumption. 
The Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Obergefell v. Hodges 
struck down all remaining state bans on same-sex marriage and 
held that states must provide marriage to same-sex couples on 
the same terms accorded to different-sex couples.5 Two years 
later, in Pavan v. Smith, the Supreme Court held that, pursuant 
to Obergefell’s mandate that marriage be accorded to same-sex 
couples on the same terms accorded to different-sex couples, if a 
state provides the different-sex spouses of individuals who give 
birth with the right to be listed on the child’s birth certificate, it 
must do the same for same-sex spouses.6 As a result of the Su-
preme Court’s decisions in Obergefell and Pavan, it is likely that 
states will need to either extend the marital presumption to en-
compass both different- and same-sex spouses of individuals7 
who give birth or abolish the presumption entirely.8 Because the 
 
 5. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015). 
 6. 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078 (2017). 
 7. It is important to note that, in addition to women, non-binary people 
and transgender men also may give birth. See Nancy Coleman, Transgender 
Man Gives Birth to a Boy, CNN (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/07/31/ 
health/trans-man-pregnancy-dad-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/MC69 
-WXZ4]. Although this Article uses gendered terms at certain points when nec-
essary to accurately reflect the language of past or current statutes or case de-
cisions, the author feels strongly that state laws that use gendered terms in 
referring to a person who gives birth must be amended to reflect that individu-
als other than women may give birth. 
 8. It is less likely that Obergefell and Pavan will be interpreted as requir-
ing the extension of existing state marital presumptions of parentage to married 
male same-sex couples who utilize a surrogate to give birth to the biological 
child of one of the spouses. This is because it is generally recognized that the 
presumption of parentage created by the marital presumption stems from an 
individual’s marriage to the person who has given birth to the child, as opposed 
to an individual’s marriage to a person who is the child’s biological parent. See, 
e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1881(1) (2015) (“A person is presumed to 
be the parent of a child if: [t]he person and the woman giving birth to the child 
are married to each other and the child is born during the marriage.”); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 15C, § 401(a) (2018) (“[A] person is presumed to be a parent of a child 
if: the person and the person who gave birth to the child are married to each 
other and the child is born during the marriage.”); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 26.26A.115(1) (2019) (“An individual is presumed to be a parent of a child 
if: . . . [t]he individual and the woman who gave birth to the child are mar-
ried . . . and the child is born during the marriage.”). More specifically, it is gen-
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marital presumption has, throughout United States history, 
played an essential role in the law governing the establishment 
 
erally recognized that the marital presumption bestows a presumption of par-
entage upon the spouse of a married individual who has given birth to a child; 
it does not bestow a presumption of parentage to the spouse of a married indi-
vidual who is merely the child’s biological parent. For example, if a married man 
fathers a child with a person who is not his spouse, the marital presumption 
does not provide a presumption of parentage to his spouse. Susan Frelich Ap-
pleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of Legitimacy in the 
Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 263 n.204 (2006). In fact, the mar-
ital presumption likely would not apply at all in that situation unless the person 
who gave birth to the child was married, in which case it would function to pro-
vide a presumption of parentage to their spouse. Although Obergefell and Pavan 
require states to extend marriage to same-sex couples on the same terms as 
those accorded to different-sex couples, the failure to extend the marital pre-
sumption to male same-sex couples does not necessarily run afoul of this man-
date—under current marital presumption standards, the spouse of a biological 
father, regardless of whether the spouse is male or female, is not encompassed 
by the marital presumption.  
Consequently, the analysis set forth in this Article does not explicitly ad-
dress the application of the marital presumption to male same-sex couples. It is 
essential to note that establishing a marital presumption applicable to male 
same-sex couples is an extremely important goal that merits attention. The dif-
ficulty in creating such a marital presumption stems from the fact that male 
same-sex couples who desire biological children generally require a surrogate. 
Jessica Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward: Extending Voluntary Acknowledg-
ments of Parentage to Female Same-Sex Couples, 30 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 99, 
118, 134 (2018). The surrogate presents a significant issue because the law gen-
erally grants parental status to individuals based upon the act of giving birth, 
and most states only recognize a maximum of two individuals as a child’s legal 
parents. Id. In order to apply a marital presumption of parentage to male same-
sex couples, most states would need to change their parentage laws to either 
recognize that a child may have more than two legal parents or deny the auto-
matic obtainment of parental status based upon the act of giving birth to indi-
viduals serving as surrogates. Id. Another option would be for states to struc-
ture the marital presumption such that, in the surrogacy context, the 
presumption would become effective as to the spouse of the child’s remaining 
legal parent at the point following the child’s birth when the surrogate’s paren-
tal rights were legally terminated. It seems likely that, in the pursuit of equity 
and justice, in the near future some states will utilize a method similar to those 
mentioned above in order to create a marital presumption that applies to male 
same-sex couples. In fact, a New York appellate court recently applied the 
state’s marital presumption to a male same-sex couple. In re Maria-Irene D., 
153 A.D.3d 1203, 1204–05 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (applying the marital presump-
tion of parentage to the biological father’s same-sex spouse where the child was 
born via surrogate during the marriage, the couple had jointly executed a sur-
rogacy agreement, and the surrogate’s rights were terminated following the 
child’s birth). For states that extend the marital presumption to male same-sex 
couples, the analysis set forth in this Article regarding modern grounds for re-
buttal will be equally relevant.  
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of legal parentage, it is highly unlikely that many states will 
choose the latter option.9 As a result, it is probable that in the 
near future, there will be a number of states that seek to extend 
their marital presumptions to same-sex spouses. Given that in 
most cases involving same-sex couples the spouse of the individ-
ual who gave birth will not be genetically connected to the child, 
in order to establish a marital presumption that effectively and 
fairly encompasses same-sex couples, states must engage in the 
important undertaking of restructuring their current marital 
presumption standards so that a spouse’s lack of genetic connec-
tion to the child is no longer the basis for rebuttal.  
The initial step that each state will need to take in crafting 
an updated marital presumption is to reconceptualize the pre-
sumption as furthering objectives unrelated to the bestowment 
of parentage to the individual most likely to be the child’s second 
genetic parent. There are a number of other core objectives that 
states could identify for the marital presumption. Specifically, 
states may identify the provision of parentage to the individual 
most likely to be the child’s second intended parent or the provi-
sion of parentage to the individual most likely to function in the 
role of the child’s second parent as the primary purpose of the 
marital presumption. Objectives related to identifying the child’s 
second intended or functional parent will likely play a key role 
in most states’ modern marital presumptions, as under current 
law intent and function have emerged as the primary alterna-
tives to genetics as the basis for the establishment of parental 
rights.10 Additional or alternative state marital presumption ob-
jectives may include the protection of marital family units from 
outside intrusion, the promotion of marriage as the preferred 
site for parentage establishment, and the furtherance of chil-
dren’s best interests. After determining which objectives it views 
as most important, each state can then structure its marital pre-
sumption in the way that most effectively furthers its goals. 
There are a number of critical decisions that states will need 
to make in structuring the details of a modern marital presump-
tion. For most states, one of the most significant determinations 
will center on identifying the basis for rebuttal. Since parental 
intent and function have emerged as the primary alternatives to 
genetics as the basis for the establishment of parental rights, re-
 
 9. See infra Part I.A. 
 10. See infra Part II.A. 
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buttal of modern marital presumptions likely will focus on prov-
ing either that the individual who gave birth and their spouse 
did not mutually intend for the spouse to be the child’s second 
parent or that the spouse did not function as the child’s parent. 
There are significant strengths and weaknesses to each of these 
approaches, and states will need to weigh a number of competing 
factors in determining whether to adopt one of these standards 
over the other or to instead create rebuttal grounds that encom-
pass both intent- and function-based considerations. Other im-
portant decisions states will need to make include identifying 
the categories of individuals granted standing to challenge the 
marital presumption and deciding whether to place time limita-
tions on rebuttal actions. Finally, states will need to make an 
important decision regarding whether to establish one uniform 
marital presumption or two separate marital presumptions, an 
approach which would likely involve the state maintaining its 
preexisting marital presumption standard for conceptions that 
occur through sexual means and applying an updated marital 
presumption standard only for conceptions that occur through 
nonsexual means. 
This Article sets forth a comprehensive analysis of the vari-
ous methods states may utilize to restructure their marital pre-
sumptions in the era of same-sex marriage. The choices that 
states make in the process of restructuring their marital pre-
sumptions are of great importance. The law governing the estab-
lishment of parentage in the United States has reached a critical 
juncture—the historical reliance on genetics-related considera-
tions in determining parentage increasingly is being called into 
question and states have begun to place greater importance on 
considerations such as intent and function in making parentage 
determinations. In restructuring their marital presumptions, 
states will be forced to reevaluate what considerations are most 
important in identifying the individuals entitled to recognition 
as a child’s legal parents, and the decisions that states make in 
this process likely will play a significant role in the modern de-
velopment of the law governing the establishment of parentage.  
The Article proceeds in the following manner. Part I first 
traces the history and development of the marital presumption, 
from its English common law roots to its current iterations under 
state law. It then explores recent state law developments regard-
ing the extension of the marital presumption to same-sex couples 
and explains why structuring a marital presumption that effec-
tively encompasses the same-sex spouses of individuals who give 
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birth will require significant changes to current marital pre-
sumption standards. Part II considers how states could recon-
ceptualize the marital presumption as promoting objectives un-
related to the identification of the individual most likely to be 
the child’s second biological parent. The alternative objectives 
explored include: the provision of parentage to the individual 
most likely to be the child’s second intended parent, the provi-
sion of parentage to the individual most likely to function in the 
role of the child’s second parent, the protection of marital family 
units from outside intrusion, the promotion of marriage as the 
preferred site for parentage establishment, and the furtherance 
of children’s best interests. Part III analyzes the various options 
available to states for restructuring the marital presumption 
and concludes by arguing that an approach to rebuttal that en-
compasses both intent- and function-based considerations will be 
most effective in furthering the objectives that most states likely 
will seek to further through a modern marital presumption. Fi-
nally, Part IV explores the possibility of states establishing two 
distinct marital presumption standards, the applicability of 
which would depend upon whether conception occurred through 
sexual or nonsexual means. 
I.  THE MARITAL PRESUMPTION: PAST AND PRESENT   
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MARITAL PRESUMPTION: A BRIEF 
HISTORY 
The marital presumption of paternity has been described as 
“one of the most firmly-established and persuasive precepts 
known in law.”11 As far back as the early 1700s, the common law 
of England set forth a presumption that a woman’s husband was 
the legal father of any child born to or conceived by the woman 
during the marriage.12 This presumption was extremely difficult 
to rebut—generally the husband or wife was required to prove 
that during the time of conception the husband was “beyond the 
four-seas,”13 and thus he was outside “the reach of both England 
and the child’s mother.”14 The presumption became even more 
 
 11. Baker v. Baker, 582 S.E.2d 102, 103 (2003). 
 12. Glennon, supra note 2, at 562. 
 13. MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY 
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 201 (1985). 
 14. David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions Between 
Legal, Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 
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difficult to rebut with the establishment of Lord Mansfield’s Rule 
in 1777.15 This rule barred both the wife and husband from tes-
tifying about the husband’s non-access to his wife during the 
time of conception.16 In the early years of the United States, 
courts applied both the marital presumption and Lord Mans-
field’s Rule.17  
In the early 1900s, states began to abolish Lord Mansfield’s 
Rule.18 The marital presumption of paternity, however, contin-
ued to be in force in most states pursuant to statute or the com-
mon law.19 The presumption was generally rebuttable through 
proof of the husband’s impotence, sterility, lack of cohabitation 
with or access to his wife during the time of conception, or proof 
of adultery on the part of the wife.20 The marital presumption 
could also be rebutted when the child’s race did not match the 
husband’s race.21 As Professor Theresa Glennon has noted, 
“[d]espite these common law bases for rebuttal, the marital pre-
sumption prevailed in all but a very limited set of circumstances 
through the first half of the twentieth century.”22 As a result, the 
marital presumption has been described as “one of the strongest 
[presumptions] known to law.”23 
There were a variety of justifications set forth for making 
the presumption so difficult to rebut. As an initial matter, it was 
viewed as necessary to further the interests and well-being of 
children. The presumption protected children from being 
deemed illegitimate, a status that carried a profound stigma and 
deprived children of significant legal rights and protections.24 
 
127 (2006); see also Glennon, supra note 2, at 562–63 (“The mother and pre-
sumed father could only rebut that presumption by proving that the husband 
did not have access to his wife during the crucial period of conception.”). 
 15. Glennon, supra note 2, at 563. 
 16. Id. at 563. 
 17. Id. at 564–65. 
 18. Id. at 565. 
 19. Id.  
 20. Id. 
 21. Appleton, supra note 8, at 251. 
 22. Glennon, supra note 2, at 565. 
 23. Susan Frelich Appleton, Illegitimacy and Sex, Old and New, 20 AM. U. 
J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 347, 350 n.14 (2012). 
 24. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 125 (1989) (“The primary policy 
rationale underlying the common law’s severe restrictions on rebuttal of the 
presumption appears to have been an aversion to declaring children illegiti-
mate, thereby depriving them of rights of inheritance and succession, and likely 
making them wards of the state.” (citations omitted)). 
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For example, under early English common law, children who 
were deemed illegitimate were considered filius nullius or the 
child of no one, and they did not have the right to receive support 
or inherit from either of their parents.25 In the United States, 
although in most states children deemed illegitimate had the 
right to receive support and inherit from their mother, the ma-
jority of states did not provide these children with the right to 
inherit from their father.26 In addition, fathers generally were 
only required to provide support if the child was receiving public 
assistance,27 and any support children deemed illegitimate were 
entitled to receive from their fathers was usually unequal in 
amount and duration to the support to which children deemed 
legitimate were entitled.28 Conversely, when the marital pre-
sumption of paternity was applied, children were provided with 
a legal father who had the duty to care for and support them 
from the time they were born.29  
Another justification set forth for the presumption was that 
it promoted parenthood within marriage, something which was 
widely viewed at the time as furthering children’s best inter-
ests.30 Moreover, in an era when scientific advancements did not 
yet allow for the definitive determination of biological paternity, 
the presumption avoided “evidentiary impasses”31 and assigned 
parentage to the man who, as a general matter, was viewed as 
 
 25. Laurence C. Nolan, “Unwed Children” and Their Parents Before the 
United States Supreme Court From Levy to Michael H.: Unlikely Participants 
in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1999). 
 26. Id. at 8; June Carbone, The Missing Piece of the Custody Puzzle: Creat-
ing a New Model of Parental Partnership, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1091, 1096 
(1999); Leslie Joan Harris, The Basis for Legal Parentage and the Clash Between 
Custody and Child Support, 42 IND. L. REV. 611, 616–17 (2009); Courtney G. 
Joslin, The Evolution of the American Family, 36 HUM. RTS. 2, 4 (2009). 
 27. Carbone, supra note 26, at 1096 (“In the United States, non-marital 
children were viewed as part of their mother’s, but not their father’s, families. 
The father might bear some responsibility to the extent that his non-marital 
child imposed a burden on the state, but the child had no claim to his father’s 
name, property, support, or companionship.”); Harris, supra note 26, at 616–17. 
 28. Nolan, supra note 25, at 8. 
 29. Mikaela Shotwell, Note, Won’t Somebody Please Think of the Chil-
dren?!: Why Iowa Must Extend the Marital Presumption to Children Born to 
Married, Same-Sex Couples, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 141, 144 (2012). 
 30. Glennon, supra note 2, at 590–91. 
 31. Debi McRae, Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Best Interests Marital 
Presumption of Paternity: It Is Actually in the Best Interests of Children to Di-
vorce the Current Application of the Best Interests Marital Presumption of Pa-
ternity, 5 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 345, 349–50 (2006). 
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the individual most likely to be the biological father of a child 
born to a married woman: her husband.32 Another primary jus-
tification for maintaining a strong marital presumption related 
to promoting the harmony and integrity of the marital family 
unit by automatically identifying the husband as the child’s legal 
father and protecting the marital family unit from challenges to 
the husband’s paternity.33 Finally, the marital presumption was 
believed to reduce government spending by ensuring that a 
greater number of children had two legal parents obligated to 
support them from the time of birth.34  
States began to amend their marital presumptions as, over 
time, a number of the traditional justifications for the mainte-
nance of a strong marital presumption faded. For example, alt-
hough the law continues to treat non-marital children differently 
than marital children in certain respects,35 the Supreme Court, 
applying the Equal Protection Clause, has struck down laws 
providing for the unequal treatment of non-marital children in a 
number of important areas.36 Notably, today every state has ex-
tended “the rights and responsibilities of parenthood [to] both 
the mothers and fathers of nonmarital children, and nonmarital 
children are entitled to inherit through both of their parents.”37 
Moreover, the traditional justification for the marital presump-
tion based upon the impossibility of determining with certainty 
whether a man is a child’s biological father has become irrele-
vant. With scientific and medical advancements in the area of 
DNA testing, it has become quite straightforward and simple to 
 
 32. Melanie B. Jacobs, Parental Parity: Intentional Parenthood’s Promise, 
64 BUFF. L. REV. 465, 478 (2016) (“And, in the majority of instances, a mother’s 
husband is, indeed, the child’s biological father.”); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Re-
productive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gen-
der Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 317 (1990) (“[O]ne presumptive purpose 
[of the marital presumption] has been the codification of empirical inference—
the best available method of determining factual biological paternity. Who is 
the biological father? The most likely candidate is the man having sexual inter-
course with the mother. Who is most likely having sexual intercourse with the 
mother? Her husband.”). 
 33. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 125 (1989). 
 34. Appleton, supra note 8, at 246–47; Glennon, supra note 2, at 563. 
 35. Joslin, supra note 26, at 4. 
 36. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (inheritance); Gomez v. Perez, 
409 U.S. 535 (1973) (support); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 
164 (1972) (workers’ compensation benefits); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 
(1968) (wrongful death claims).  
 37. Joslin, supra note 26, at 4. 
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accurately determine whether a man is a child’s biological fa-
ther.38 
Today, while every state continues to apply the marital pre-
sumption of paternity in some form, there have been some sig-
nificant changes with regard to the structure of states’ marital 
presumptions.39 A majority of states, approximately two-thirds, 
through statute or court decision have extended standing to chal-
lenge the presumption not only to the individual who gave birth, 
their spouse, and child support enforcement agencies, but also to 
biological fathers who conceive children with individuals who 
are married to someone else.40 Rebutting the marital presump-
tion usually requires, at a minimum, DNA testing indicating 
that the putative father is the child’s biological father or that the 
husband of the individual who gave birth is not the child’s bio-
logical father.41 However, in a number of states, courts can re-
fuse to admit genetic testing evidence if the court determines 
 
 38. Paternity Tests: Blood Tests and DNA, FINDLAW, https://family.findlaw 
.com/paternity/paternity-tests-blood-tests-and-dna.html 
[https://perma.cc/H9BA-5U4A]. 
 39. See Harris, supra note 26, at 622–23. 
 40. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 607 cmt. (UNIFORM LAW COMM’N 2002) (“As of 
the year 2000, the right of an ‘outsider’ to claim paternity of a child born to a 
married woman varies considerably among the states. Thirty-three states allow 
a man alleging himself to be the father of a child with a presumed father to 
rebut the marital presumption. Some states have granted this right through 
legislation, while in other states case law has recognized the alleged father’s 
right to rebut the presumption and establish his paternity.”); June Carbone & 
Naomi Cahn, Jane the Virgin and Other Stories of Unintentional Parenthood, 7 
UC IRVINE L. REV. 511, 513 (2017) [hereinafter Carbone & Cahn, Jane the Vir-
gin] (“Today, however, two-thirds of the states permit a biological father to con-
test the marital presumption, whatever the intent of the parties at the time of 
conception or the parties’ respective roles after the birth.”).  
 41. Leslie Joan Harris, Obergefell’s Ambiguous Impact on Legal Parentage, 
92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55, 73 (2017) (“[T]oday, when the spouses are opposite-
sex, the presumption may be rebutted with genetic evidence.”); Paula A. Monop-
oli, Inheritance Law and the Marital Presumption After Obergefell?, 8 EST. 
PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 437, 448 (2016) (“In an opposite-sex marriage, 
the presumption would typically be rebutted by DNA evidence today. The court 
would order genetic testing and, if the husband had no genetic link to the child, 
the court may determine that he is not the legal parent.”); see also Joanna L. 
Grossman, Parentage Without Gender, 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 717, 
738 (2016) (“Most marital presumptions are rebuttable today, some upon proof 
of no genetic tie between husband and child, some only if a court decree estab-
lishes paternity in another man.”). 
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that doing so would be contrary to the child’s best interests42 or 
that the party seeking to submit such evidence should be es-
topped from doing so on equitable grounds.43 Additionally, even 
if the genetic testing evidence is admitted demonstrating that 
the husband is not the child’s biological father, in some states 
similar types of analyses may occur to determine whether the 
husband should nonetheless maintain his status as the child’s 
legal father.44 As Professor June Carbone has explained, “proof 
that the husband is not the biological father does not solely rebut 
the presumption; instead, doing so may involve the consideration 
of the child’s interests, the degree to which the husband assumed 
a paternal role, and/or the biological father’s ability and willing-
ness to provide support.”45 As a general matter, “[c]ourts are 
quite reluctant to undercut the marital presumption when the 
mother and her husband have co-parented the child, the hus-
band has provided financial and emotional support to the child, 
 
 42. See infra note 107; see also Harris, supra note 26, at 623 (“If the pre-
sumption is challenged by the offer of genetic evidence, a number of states have 
held that a court can refuse to admit that evidence if contrary to the child’s best 
interests. Other courts have reached the same result on the basis that the party 
offering the rebuttal evidence is estopped to deny parentage because of the det-
rimental reliance of the other party or, sometimes, the child.”); Monopoli, supra 
note 41, at 448 (“Courts do retain the equitable power to declare that, even de-
spite a genetic connection and the rebuttal of the presumption, the child’s best 
interests require the husband to retain legal parentage.”); Rhonda Wasserman, 
DOMA and the Happy Family: A Lesson in Irony, 41 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 275, 283 
(2010) (“Some states permit the presumption of parentage to be rebutted only if 
doing so would serve the child’s best interests. In these states, when alleged 
biological fathers claim paternity of children born during an intact marriage, 
courts decline to order blood tests or DNA tests to determine paternity unless 
the determination would be in the child’s best interests.”). 
 43. See infra notes 108–09 and accompanying text.  
 44. See, e.g., In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2, 15 (Cal. 2004) (holding that another 
man’s biological paternity does not necessarily rebut the husband’s presump-
tion of parentage and that considerations based upon policy and logic, such as 
the welfare of the child, factor into the determination of who should be deemed 
the legal father); N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354, 357 (Colo. 2000) (“We hold that 
the best interests of the child must be of paramount concern throughout a pa-
ternity proceeding, and therefore, must be explicitly considered as a part of the 
policy and logic analysis that is used to resolve competing presumptions of fa-
therhood [between a genetic father and the husband of the child’s mother].”); 
Kelly v. Cataldo, 488 N.W.2d 822, 827 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that the 
child’s best interests should be considered in determining whether the mother’s 
husband or the genetic father should be deemed the child’s legal father). 
 45. June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Nonmarriage, 76 MD. L. REV. 55, 87 
(2016) [hereinafter Carbone & Cahn, Nonmarriage].  
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and the child has bonded with the husband.”46 Finally, presum-
ably in an effort to minimize harmful disruption to children and 
their established families, some states set forth time limitations 
for challenging the marital presumption.47 These time limita-
tions for challenging the presumption commonly range from two 
to five years after the child’s birth depending on the state.48 
Overall, under current law the marital presumption continues to 
play an extremely significant role in the establishment of par-
entage, as it remains the most common way of establishing a 
person other than the individual who gave birth as a child’s legal 
parent.49  
B. THE EXTENSION OF THE MARITAL PRESUMPTION TO 
SAME-SEX COUPLES 
Until relatively recently, no jurisdiction within the United 
States granted same-sex couples the right to marry. Conse-
quently, use of the marital presumption to establish the same-
sex partner of the individual who gave birth as the child’s second 
legal parent was simply not an option. In 2004, however, Massa-
chusetts became the first state to legalize same-sex marriage.50 
 
 46. Wasserman, supra note 42, at 283. 
 47. See PROPOSED REVISION OF THE UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 605 cmt. 
(UNIFORM LAW COMM’N 1999) (stating that the two-year time limit on challeng-
ing the marital presumption was adopted because “a longer period may have 
severe consequences for the child”). 
 48. Though states differ with regard to the details, including the exceptions 
under which the time limitation is not applicable, a number of states have 
adopted some form of a time limitation for rebutting the marital presumption. 
See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7541 (2018) (two years from the child’s birth); COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 19-4-107 (2017) (within a reasonable time, but in no event more 
than five years from the child’s birth); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-607 (2018) 
(two years from the child’s birth); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/205 (West 2018) 
(two years after the petitioner gains knowledge of the relevant facts); ME. STAT. 
tit. 19-A, § 1882 (2015) (two years after the child’s birth); MINN. STAT. § 257.57 
(2018) (two years after the party bringing the action has reason to believe that 
the presumed father is not the child’s biological father, but in no event more 
than three years from the child’s birth); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-20-42 (2017) (two 
years after the child’s birth); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7700-607 (2018) (two years 
after the child’s birth); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-2-304(b)(2)(A) (2018) (twelve 
months after the child’s birth); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.607 (West 2017) 
(four years after the child’s birth); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-807 (2018) (within a 
reasonable time after obtaining the relevant knowledge, but in no event more 
than five years after the child’s birth). 
 49. Katharine K. Baker, Legitimate Families and Equal Protection, 56 B.C. 
L. REV. 1647, 1659 (2015). 
 50. Looking Back at the Legalization of Gay Marriage in Mass., BOS. GLOBE 
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Between 2004 and 2015, same-sex marriage expanded rapidly 
throughout the United States, culminating with the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, which struck down the 
remaining state bans on same-sex marriage.51 Obergefell set 
forth the important proposition that states may not “bar same-
sex couples from marriage on the same terms as accorded to cou-
ples of the opposite sex.”52 While Obergefell did not explicitly dis-
cuss the extension of the marital presumption to same-sex cou-
ples, if states must provide marriage to same-sex couples on the 
same terms as accorded to different-sex couples, the marital pre-
sumption of parentage53 should apply equally to both different- 
and same-sex spouses of individuals who give birth.54 This read-
ing of Obergefell is further supported by the Supreme Court’s 
2017 decision in Pavan v. Smith, in which the Court held that 
under Obergefell, Arkansas could not refuse to list the name of a 
birth mother’s same-sex spouse on the child’s birth certificate 
when state law generally required the names of different-sex 
spouses of individuals who give birth to appear on birth certifi-
cates.55 
Indeed, in several cases following a jurisdiction’s legaliza-
tion of same-sex marriage, courts have been asked to determine 
whether the marital presumption of parentage extends to the 
same-sex spouse of an individual who gives birth. To date, most 
 
(June 26, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/06/26/looking-back 
-legalization-gay-marriage-mass/uhCeyrSeJtWty9tSUde1PI/story.html. 
 51. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015). 
 52. Id. at 2607.  
 53. With its extension to same-sex couples, it will make more sense to refer 
to the presumption as the “marital presumption of parentage” as opposed to the 
“marital presumption of paternity.” 
 54. COURTNEY G. JOSLIN ET AL., LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL & TRANSGENDER 
FAMILY LAW § 5:22 (2018) (“After Obergefell v. Hodges, all marriage-based par-
entage rules—including the marital presumption—should be applied equally to 
same-sex spouses (although some states may initially resist this proposition).”). 
 55. 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2077 (2017). However, Pavan concerned only birth cer-
tificates, not the presumption of parentage itself, and generally “a birth certifi-
cate is merely prima facie evidence of the information stated within.” JOSLIN ET 
AL., supra note 54, § 5:25. 
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courts that have addressed the issue, though not all,56 have an-
swered this question in the affirmative.57 In addition, a handful 
 
 56. See, e.g., In re Paczkowski v. Paczkowski, 128 A.D.3d 968, 969 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2015) (holding that the statutory marital presumptions of paternity 
did not apply to the wife of a woman who conceived a child during the marriage, 
“since the presumption of legitimacy [the statutes] create is one of a biological 
relationship, not of legal status . . . and, as the non-gestational spouse in a same-
sex marriage, there is no possibility that [the wife] is the child’s biological par-
ent” (citations omitted)); Q.M. v. B.C., 999 N.Y.S.2d 470, 474 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 
2014) (declining to apply the marital presumption of paternity to a same-sex 
couple and explaining that the state’s “Marriage Equality Act does not require 
the court to ignore the obvious biological differences between husbands and 
wives”); In Interest of A.E., No. 09-16-00019-CV, 2017 WL 1535101, at *8 (Tex. 
App. Apr. 27, 2017) (declining to apply the marital presumption to a same-sex 
couple and stating that “Obergefell did not hold that every state law related to 
the marital relationship or the parent-child relationship must be ‘gender neu-
tral’”). 
 57. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Jones ex rel. Cty. of Pima, 401 P.3d 492, 496–
98 (Ariz. 2017) (holding that Obergefell requires the extension of the state’s mar-
ital presumption of parentage to same-sex couples); Barse v. Pasternak, No. 
HHBFA124030541S, 2015 WL 600973, at *10 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 16, 2015) 
(“[T]his court finds that the protections of Connecticut’s common-law presump-
tion of legitimacy apply equally to children of same-sex and opposite-sex mar-
ried couples and that the marital presumption applies equally to same-sex and 
opposite-sex marriages.”); Gartner v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 
335, 340–41 (Iowa 2013) (holding that due to its language excluding married 
female same-sex couples, the existing marital presumption statute was uncon-
stitutional and striking down the portion of the statute containing the exclu-
sionary language); Joseph O. v. Danielle B., 71 N.Y.S.3d 549, 552 (App. Div. 
2018) (holding that the state’s marital presumption of parentage applies to 
same-sex couples); Christopher YY. v. Jessica ZZ., 69 N.Y.S.3d 887, 893 (App. 
Div. 2018) (“While a workable rubric has not yet been developed to afford chil-
dren the same protection regardless of the gender composition of their parents’ 
marriage, and the Legislature has not addressed this dilemma, we believe that 
it must be true that a child born to a same-gender married couple is presumed 
to be their child . . . .”); see also Kerry Abrams & R. Kent Piacenti, Immigration’s 
Family Values, 100 VA. L. REV. 629, 709 (2014) (“Most states that recognize 
same-sex marriages, for example, also extend the marital presumption of pater-
nity to gay and lesbian couples, even though in many of these instances there is 
no chance that the marital parent is also the genetic parent.”); cf. Miller-Jenkins 
v. Miller-Jenkins, No. 454-11-03, 2004 WL 6040794 (Vt. Super. Ct. Nov. 17, 
2004) (ruling that because civil unions granted same-sex couples all of the rights 
and obligations of marriage, the marital presumption of paternity applied to 
same-sex couples who had entered into civil unions). The vast majority of cases 
addressing the application of the marital presumption of paternity to same-sex 
couples have involved female same-sex couples, and it is unclear whether courts 
will be willing to apply the presumption to male same-sex couples, who require 
a surrogate in order to conceive a child via ART. See Appleton, supra note 8, at 
260–61; Alexandra Eisman, The Extension of the Presumption of Legitimacy to 
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of jurisdictions have amended their marital presumption stat-
utes to clarify that the presumption applies to the spouse of an 
individual who gives birth regardless of the spouse’s sex.58 It 
seems probable that in the near future a number of states, par-
ticularly those states that are generally friendly to LGBTQ 
rights, will explicitly extend the marital presumption to encom-
pass the same-sex spouses of individuals who give birth.  
Furthermore, assuming that Obergefell and Pavan are not 
overturned, all states will eventually be left with two options re-
garding the future of the marital presumption. To comply with 
Obergefell’s mandate of according marriage to same-sex couples 
on the same terms accorded to different-sex couples,59 states 
likely will need to either extend the presumption to the same-sex 
spouses of individuals who give birth or abolish the presumption 
entirely such that it does not apply to either the same- or differ-
ent-sex spouses of individuals who give birth.60 It is likely that if 
states are left with the option of either abrogating the marital 
presumption entirely or extending it to same-sex couples, most, 
if not all, will choose the latter alternative. As mentioned above, 
the marital presumption is one of the longest-standing and most 
firmly-established legal concepts, and it remains the most com-
mon way of establishing an individual as a child’s second legal 
parent.61  
In addition, although some of the traditional justifications 
for the marital presumption no longer exist,62 there are a num-
ber of remaining justifications for the continued application of 
the presumption. The presumption serves as a simple, easy-to-
 
Same-Sex Couples in New York, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 579, 593–95 (2013). 
However, a New York appellate court recently held that the state’s marital pre-
sumption of paternity applied to a male same-sex couple who had jointly entered 
into a valid surrogacy agreement during their marriage. In re Maria-Irene D., 
153 A.D.3d 1203, 1204–05 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017). 
 58. See Douglas NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L.J. 2260, 
2339, app. A at 2363 (2017) (“While most states[’] [marital presumptions] con-
tinue to refer to the man married to the mother, a handful of states have revised 
their statutory marital presumptions to recognize the person married to the 
mother.”).  
 59. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015). 
 60. See JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 54, § 5:22 (“After Obergefell v. Hodges, all 
marriage-based parentage rules—including the marital presumption—should 
be applied equally to same-sex spouses (although some states may initially re-
sist this proposition).”); Harris, supra note 41, at 74 (“Obergefell very likely re-
quires that same-sex couples have the benefit of the marital presumption.”).  
 61. See Baker, supra note 49, at 1659. 
 62. See supra notes 35–38 and accompanying text. 
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apply method of providing children born to a married person 
with a second legal parent from the moment of birth.63 Providing 
children with two legal parents from birth, each of whom has a 
duty to care for and support the child, long has been viewed as 
promoting not only children’s best interests,64 but also societal 
interests.65 In addition, many people continue to adhere to the 
belief that children benefit from being raised within a marital 
family unit.66 Moreover, stable marital families are still viewed 
as “a critical social good,” and the presumption continues to 
serve the purpose of protecting the integrity of marriages.67 By 
automatically providing parental status to the spouse of the in-
dividual who gave birth without any requirement of proof of a 
biological tie between the spouse and child, the presumption pro-
motes harmony and unity within the marital family unit. Fur-
thermore, “by making it less likely that others will undermine 
 
 63. See Jacobs, supra note 32, at 470 (stating that the presumption has 
“ease of application”); see also Shotwell, supra note 29, at 144 (“Because this 
legal status carries with it a number of rights and duties, the marital presump-
tion, in effect, ‘gives the child a legal father who must provide care and support 
for the child.’” (citation omitted)).  
 64. William M. Lopez, Artificial Insemination and the Presumption of 
Parenthood: Traditional Foundations and Modern Applications for Lesbian 
Mothers, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 897, 902–03 (2011) (“[C]hildren benefit from the 
simple fact of having a legally recognized relationship with both parents.”); see 
also Jennifer B. Mertus, In re Adoption of R.B.F.: A Step Toward the Recognition 
and Acceptance of Non-Traditional Families, 3 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. AD-
VOC. 171, 185 (2003) (“Having two legal parents, regardless of their sexuality, 
provides many economic, legal, and psychological benefits to a child.”). 
 65. See Appleton, supra note 8, at 246 (“A less altruistic version of the child-
welfare rationale for the presumption of legitimacy shifts the focus to the public 
or society in general. On a purely practical level, the law’s preference for the 
marital family long has helped protect the public purse and the public interest 
in clear rules of descent.”); see also Mark Strasser, Presuming Parentage, 25 
TEX. J. WOMEN, GENDER, & L. 57, 60 (2015). 
 66. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2590 (2015) (discussing “the 
significant material costs of being raised by unmarried parents,” including be-
ing “relegated to a more difficult and uncertain family life”); see also Goodridge 
v. Dep’t of Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 964 (Mass. 2003) (describing marriage as 
the “foremost setting for the education and socialization of children” (citation 
omitted)); Appleton, supra note 8, at 243–47 (“According to one popular under-
standing today, the presumption of legitimacy has served and should continue 
to serve a child-welfare objective.”); Glennon, supra note 2, at 590–91 (“Courts 
often justify privileging the marital relationship on the ground that parenthood 
within marriage best protects children.”). 
 67. Vivian Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 
31, 39 n.25 (2006). 
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the stability of the family, the presumption increases the likeli-
hood that the family will remain together.”68 It has also been 
suggested that the security provided to the spouse of the individ-
ual who gives birth as a result of the presumption’s automatic 
provision of parental status increases the likelihood that the 
spouse will bond with the child.69 Overall, in the vast majority of 
cases, the presumption is never challenged, and thus it generally 
serves to “protect[] [both] the functional parent-child relation-
ship and the integrity of the marriage.”70 
This is not to say that the marital presumption is the wisest, 
fairest, or most effective way to establish parentage—scholars 
have set forth a variety of innovative, thoughtful proposals for 
other methods of establishing parentage for married and unmar-
ried individuals71—just that it is unlikely that most states will 
abrogate the marital presumption any time soon. As a result, it 
is probable that in the not-so-distant future, there will be a num-
ber of states that seek to extend their marital presumptions to 
same-sex spouses. In doing so, these states will need to grapple 
with how rebuttal of the presumption, which has traditionally 
focused on the lack of genetic connection between the spouse of 
the individual who gave birth and the child,72 will now be struc-
tured given that in most cases involving same-sex couples the 
spouse will not be genetically connected to the child.73 The re-
mainder of the Article will explore the approaches that states 
 
 68. Strasser, supra note 65, at 60. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Harris, supra note 41, at 67. 
 71. See, e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Quacking Like a Duck? Functional 
Parenthood Doctrine and Same-Sex Parents, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 135, 160–64 
(2017) (proposing an opt-in system for the establishment of legal parentage); 
Leslie Joan Harris, Voluntary Acknowledgements of Parentage for Same Sex 
Couples, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 467, 475–78 (2012) (proposing 
that voluntary acknowledgements of parentage be extended to all couples, re-
gardless of sex); Jacobs, supra note 32, at 466–67 (proposing that “legislatures 
should consider intentional parenthood as the default, at-birth parentage estab-
lishment model” and that voluntary acknowledgements of parentage be offered 
to all parents); Shultz, supra note 32, at 322–25 (proposing an intent-based ap-
proach to parentage determinations in the assisted reproduction context); Rich-
ard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the 
Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 679 (2002) (proposing 
an intent-based regime for parentage establishment). 
 72. See supra notes 20–21, 41. 
 73. The exception would be if the couple undertook co-maternity or recipro-
cal IVF, wherein one member of the couple provides genetic materials and the 
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may take to restructuring the marital presumption of parentage 
given its likely extension to same-sex couples. 
II.  RECONCEPTUALIZING THE MARITAL PRESUMPTION 
OF PARENTAGE IN THE ERA OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE   
For states to determine how to best restructure their marital 
presumptions of parentage in order to encompass same-sex cou-
ples, they must first identify what they believe to be the primary 
modern purpose of the presumption. The extension of the mari-
tal presumption to same-sex couples would effectively dispense 
with any lingering notion that the presumption’s primary pur-
pose is to bestow parentage on the individual most likely to be 
the child’s second genetic parent.74 The focus of modern day mar-
ital presumptions and grounds for rebuttal therefore will need 
to move beyond genetics. There are a number of other potential 
purposes for the marital presumption that states could iden-
tify.75 Specifically, states could identify as the primary purpose 
of the presumption the provision of parentage to the individual 
most likely to be the child’s second intended parent or the provi-
sion of parentage to the individual most likely to function in the 
role of the child’s second parent.76 Additional or alternative pur-
poses may include the protection of marital family units from 
outside intrusion, the promotion of marriage as the preferred 
site for parentage establishment, and the furtherance of chil-
dren’s best interests.77 After determining which potential pur-
poses it views as most important, the state can then structure 
 
other member carries the pregnancy. See Lauren B. Paulk, Embryonic Person-
hood: Implications for Assisted Reproductive Technology in International Hu-
man Rights Law, 22 AM. U.J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 781, 788 (2014) (describ-
ing the reciprocal IVF process). 
 74. Appleton, supra note 8, at 285 (“[W]e can now see the presumption not 
as assumption of the husband’s probable genetic connection to the child.”); see 
also Grossman, supra note 41, at 739 (“In the context of two women who to-
gether plan for the conception and birth of a child, what is marriage a proxy for? 
It is certainly not a proxy for biology—our best guess about the identity of the 
child’s other genetic parent—as it was for married fathers.”); Douglas NeJaime, 
Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1186, 1247 
(2016) (“The same-sex couple, by contrast, makes the biological reality knowable 
and public, and thus explicitly disturbs the biological assumptions of the pre-
sumption.”). 
 75. See discussion infra Parts III.A–B. 
 76. See infra Part III.A. 
 77. See infra Part III.B. 
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its marital presumption in the way that most effectively furthers 
its objectives. 
A. IDENTIFYING THE INDIVIDUAL MOST LIKELY TO BE THE 
CHILD’S SECOND INTENDED OR FUNCTIONAL PARENT 
The idea that the marital presumption, given its extension 
to same-sex couples, can be reconceptualized as serving the pur-
pose of providing parentage to the individual most likely to be 
the child’s second intended parent has been advanced by a num-
ber of scholars.78 This conception of the marital presumption ap-
pears to be grounded in the notion that in the vast majority of 
cases involving a child born to a married individual, the individ-
ual who gave birth and their spouse will have mutually intended 
for the spouse to be the child’s second parent.79 Under this view, 
the marriage serves as a proxy for the spouses’ mutual intent to 
serve as the parents to any children conceived by or born to one 
of the spouses during the marriage.80 If a state determines that 
the primary purpose of the marital presumption is to grant par-
entage to the individual most likely to be the child’s second in-
tended parent, then the grounds for rebuttal would focus on 
 
 78. See, e.g., Carbone & Cahn, Jane the Virgin, supra note 40, at 534 (“[T]he 
marital presumption, in the context of same-sex couples, presumes that mar-
riage means consent to the assumption of equal parent rights and responsibili-
ties for children born into the union . . . .”); Harris, supra note 41, at 73 (“To 
recognize the marital presumption for same-sex couples is equivalent to recog-
nizing that the spouse of the person who bore the child is a legal parent because 
she is the intended parent, the functional parent, or both.”); Douglas NeJaime, 
The Family’s Constitution, in 32 CONST. COMMENT. 413, 439 (2017) (“Now, the 
presumption rests on the horizontal relationship between the partners and their 
mutual agreement regarding the parental role vis-à-vis the child. . . . The mar-
ital presumption, in other words, makes sense because it provides an indication 
of intent and conduct.”). 
 79. See Carbone & Cahn, Nonmarriage, supra note 45, at 89 (“[A]pplication 
of the marital presumption [to same-sex couples] assumes that by marrying, 
each spouse consents to the assumption of joint and equal parental roles.”). 
 80. Carbone & Cahn, Jane the Virgin, supra note 40, at 532 (“With the abil-
ity of same-sex couples to wed, courts will have to decide, first, how to apply the 
marital presumption . . . . In the process, intent is likely to be a factor that acts 
together with the new understandings of marriage, rather than as an independ-
ent principle. That is, a same-sex spouse should be presumed to consent, on the 
basis of the marriage, to assume a parental role with respect to her spouse’s 
children . . . .”); Carbone & Cahn, Nonmarriage, supra note 45, at 89; Grossman, 
supra note 41, at 739 (“So what does marriage stand for here? It seems, for some 
courts, to stand as a proxy for consent of the definite legal parent—the biological 
mother—to share parental rights.”). 
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proving a lack of intent on the part of the individual who gave 
birth and/or their spouse for the spouse to be the child’s parent.81 
A number of scholars have also advanced the idea that the 
marital presumption can be reconceptualized as providing legal 
parentage to the individual, besides the person who gives birth, 
who is most likely to function as the child’s parent.82 This con-
ception of the marital presumption assumes that in most cases, 
the spouse of the individual who gives birth will take on the role 
of the child’s second parent, providing the type of support and 
care for the child generally expected of individuals serving as 
parents.83 Under this view of the marital presumption, marriage 
serves as a proxy for the willingness to undertake a parental role 
to any child conceived by or born to an individual’s spouse during 
the marriage.84 If a state identifies the purpose of the marital 
presumption as providing legal parentage to the person who is 
most likely to function as a child’s second parent, rebutting the 
presumption would focus on proving that the spouse had not 
functioned in a parental role to the child in question.85 
 
 81. See Wendy G-M. v. Erin G-M., 985 N.Y.S.2d 845, 847 (Sup. Ct. 2014) 
(“The marital consent presumed in this case may be rebutted by either spouse 
in the same-sex marriage. The birthmother could produce evidence that she 
never intended her spouse to be the parent of the AID child. The unknowing 
spouse would be faced with a presumption of consent to parenthood by virtue of 
the marriage and would have ample opportunity to rebut the presumption with 
evidence that the birth mother failed to obtain any consent prior to the concep-
tion.”); Monopoli, supra note 41, at 457 (“[T]he new presumption would be 
grounded in the concept that presumes every spouse consents to a child who is 
born during the marriage and intends that child to be his or hers, unless evi-
dence is presented to rebut the presumption of consent.”). 
 82. See, e.g., Appleton, supra note 8, at 285–86 (“Instead, the presumption 
today reflects the belief that someone legally connected to the woman bearing 
the child likely planned for the child, demonstrated a willingness to assume 
responsibility, or provided support (emotional and/or economic) during the preg-
nancy, in turn supporting the expected child. In other words, an adult legally 
connected to the mother is likely even before the child’s birth to have played a 
functional role . . . .”); Harris, supra note 41, at 73 (“To recognize the marital 
presumption for same-sex couples is equivalent to recognizing that the spouse 
of the person who bore the child is a legal parent because she is the intended 
parent, the functional parent, or both.”).  
 83. See Harris, supra note 41, at 67 (“In the great majority of cases, the 
presumption also protects the functional parent-child relationship and the in-
tegrity of the marriage, since no effort is made to rebut the presumption.”). 
 84. Appleton, supra note 8, at 285–86. 
 85. See id. at 291 (“I would leave open the possibility that the functional 
test which led to my default rule might allow rebuttal for a designated parent 
who never performed any parental functions for the child in question.”). 
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Focusing on notions of intent and/or function in addressing 
questions relating to legal parentage and parental rights, partic-
ularly within the context of children conceived or born during 
existing marriages, is in line with a number of developments in 
parentage law that extend the focus of parentage determinations 
beyond biology.86 As one scholar has aptly noted, “[a]lthough 
they may be stated in a variety of ways, there are essentially two 
alternative approaches to parentage apart from DNA. These ap-
proaches are intent-based parentage . . . and a functional family 
or de facto parent analysis.”87 With regard to intent, across ju-
risdictions a husband who consents to his wife’s use of assisted 
reproduction to conceive a child with the intent to be the result-
ing child’s parent is deemed the child’s second legal parent re-
gardless of whether the child is conceived using the husband’s 
sperm or donor sperm.88 Pursuant to Obergefell, these laws 
should extend to a same-sex spouse who, with the intent to be 
the resulting child’s parent, consents to their spouse’s use of as-
sisted reproduction to conceive a child.89 Indeed, courts that have 
addressed the issue generally have ruled that assisted reproduc-
tion statutes that on their face apply only to married different-
sex couples extend to married same-sex couples,90 and a growing 
number of states are making their statutes governing spousal 
parentage in the assisted reproduction context gender neutral.91  
Furthermore, intent is gaining an increasingly significant 
role in parentage determinations outside of the marriage con-
text—twelve jurisdictions have statutes establishing parentage 
for unmarried men who consent to a partner’s use of assisted re-
production to conceive a child with the intent to be the resulting 
 
 86. In 1990, Professor Marjorie Shultz proposed the intent-based approach 
to determine the parentage of children conceived using assisted reproduction. 
Shultz, supra note 32, at 322–25. 
 87. Julie Shapiro, Counting from One: Replacing the Marital Presumption 
with a Presumption of Sole Parentage, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 
509, 516 (2012). 
 88. See JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 54, § 3:3. Some of these laws require that 
the assisted reproduction procedure occur under the supervision of a doctor 
and/or that the husband’s consent to the procedure be in writing. Id. 
 89. See id. (“After the decision in Obergefell v. Hodges requiring that states 
permit and recognize marriages between same-sex spouses on the ‘same terms 
and conditions’ as for different-sex spouses, these rules . . . must be applied 
equally to same-sex couples who have children through assisted reproduction 
during their marriage.”). 
 90. See NeJaime, supra note 58, at 2294 & n.164. 
 91. See id. at 2294 & n.163. 
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child’s parent,92 and nine of those jurisdictions’ statutes also ex-
tend to unmarried same-sex partners.93 In addition, pursuant to 
federal law, all states must allow unmarried birth mothers and 
their male partners to establish the partner’s legal paternity 
through the execution of a voluntary acknowledgement of pater-
nity without requiring any proof that the partner is the child’s 
biological father.94 While some states’ voluntary acknowledge-
ment forms indicate that only biological fathers should sign and 
parties can attempt to challenge voluntary acknowledgements 
on the grounds of fraud or material mistake stemming from the 
partner’s lack of biological tie to the child, a number of courts 
have denied such challenges on equitable grounds95 and it is in-
disputable that an unchallenged voluntary acknowledgement al-
lows for the establishment of parentage based only on the con-
sent of the person who gives birth and their partner.96 Finally, 
while surrogacy laws differ significantly across jurisdictions, a 
number of states recognize gestational surrogacy agreements 
and have adopted intent-based approaches to determining par-
entage in such situations.97 
With regard to the role of function in determinations of pa-
rental rights, at least eighteen states have adopted equitable 
parenthood doctrines that grant child custody or visitation rights 
to individuals who are not formal legal parents, but who have 
 
 92. See JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 54, § 3:3. 
 93. See id. These statutes do not require that the two individuals share a 
nonmarital partnership that is romantic in nature. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
15C, § 703 (2018) (“A person who consents under section 704 of this title to as-
sisted reproduction by another person with the intent to be a parent of a child 
conceived by the assisted reproduction is a parent of the child.”).  
 94. Feinberg, supra note 8, at 118. 
 95. See id. (“Some courts have required evidence of fraud or mistake in ad-
dition to the genetic testing results, denied rescission if doing so would be con-
trary to the best interests of the child, or used theories of equitable estoppel to 
deny rescission.”). 
 96. Leslie Joan Harris, Reforming Paternity Law to Eliminate Gender, Sta-
tus, and Class Inequality, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1295, 1296 (2013) (“Today in 
all states intent to assume the role of father is protected by rules regarding the 
establishment of legal paternity, since all states have a version of the marital 
presumption and, for nonmarital children, all states allow the mother and the 
intended father to establish paternity by signing and filing a voluntary acknowl-
edgment of paternity (VAP).”). 
 97. NeJaime, supra note 58, at 2346, app. E at 2376 (setting forth states’ 
statutes and appellate case law governing parental establishment in the gesta-
tional surrogacy context). 
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functioned in a parental role to a child.98 The most widely 
adopted test for determining whether an individual qualifies for 
relief under a state’s equitable parenthood doctrine requires the 
petitioner to prove that: (1) the legal parent consented to and/or 
encouraged the formation of a parent-like relationship between 
the petitioner and child; (2) the petitioner lived in a household 
with the child; (3) the petitioner “assumed obligations of 
parenthood by taking significant responsibility for the child’s 
care, education and development, including contributing to-
wards the child’s support, without expectation of financial com-
pensation”; and (4) the petitioner served in the role of a parent 
for long enough to have established a parent-like bond and rela-
tionship with the child.99 Additionally, while equitable 
parenthood doctrines often only provide certain parental rights 
relating to custody and visitation, “holding out” provisions can 
be used to establish full legal parentage for individuals who have 
behaved akin to parents in certain respects despite a lack of ge-
netic connection to the child.100 These provisions, rooted origi-
nally in the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act, generally create a pre-
sumption of parentage for a man who receives a child into his 
home and holds the child out as his own for a requisite amount 
of time.101 Many states have adopted holding out or similar pro-
visions, and courts in at least six states have held that such pro-
visions also are applicable to women who are not genetically con-
nected to the children in question, but who have received the 
child into their home and held the child out as their own.102 In 
doing so, one court explained that “it is practicable for a woman 
to hold a child out as her own by, among other things, providing 
full-time emotional and financial support for the child.”103 Nota-
bly, the 2017 Uniform Parentage Act, which as of 2019 has been 
 
 98. Jessica Feinberg, Whither the Functional Parent? Revisiting Equitable 
Parenthood Doctrines in Light of Same-Sex Parents’ Increased Access to Obtain-
ing Formal Legal Parent Status, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 55, 56 (2017) (“Common ti-
tles for such doctrines include ‘de facto parentage, psychological parent, in loco 
parentis, [and] parent by estoppel.’” (citation omitted)). 
 99. Id. at 69, n.83. 
 100. Id. at 86. 
 101. JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 54, § 5:22. 
 102. Id.  
 103. Chatterjee v. King, 280 P.3d 283, 285–86 (N.M. 2012). 
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enacted in three states,104 sets forth a holding out presumption 
that is written in gender neutral terms.105 
Importantly, courts in a number of jurisdictions have al-
ready given function and/or intent a significant role in cases in-
volving attempts to rebut the marital presumption of parentage. 
As discussed above, the law in a number of states permits courts 
to refuse to admit genetic testing evidence or to uphold the hus-
band’s parental status despite genetic testing evidence indicat-
ing that he is not the biological father in situations in which re-
butting the presumption would be contrary to the child’s best 
interests or run afoul of equitable principles.106 A number of 
courts, in refusing to allow the presumption to be challenged or 
overcome on the basis that rebuttal would be contrary to the best 
interests of the child, have relied on the fact that the husband 
had functioned in the role of the child’s parent and had formed a 
parental bond with the child.107 Courts have also used equitable 
 
 104. Parentage Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/ 
committees/community-home?CommunityKey=c4f37d2d-4d20-4be0-8256 
-22dd73af068f [https://perma.cc/2BYJ-52V9]. 
 105. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (“An indi-
vidual is presumed to be a parent of a child if . . . the individual resided in the 
same household with the child for the first two years of the life of the child, 
including any period of temporary absence, and openly held out the child as the 
individual’s child.”). 
 106. See supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text.  
 107. See, e.g., Williamson v. Williamson, 690 S.E.2d 257, 258–59 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2010) (refusing mother’s request for genetic testing where the husband 
and child shared a “‘very strong’ father/son relationship” on the grounds that 
the mother had failed to show that delegitimation would be in the child’s best 
interests); Evans v. Wilson, 856 A.2d 679, 693 (Md. 2004) (refusing alleged bio-
logical father’s request for genetic testing on the grounds that it would be con-
trary to the child’s best interest where the mother’s husband had bonded with 
the child and the child relied upon the husband to meet the child’s “financial, 
emotional, and health needs”); M.H.B. v. H.T.B., 498 A.2d 775, 779 (N.J. 1985) 
(refusing to allow the husband to rebut the marital presumption where his con-
duct resulted in him becoming the child’s psychological father and reasoning 
that “[w]ere [the husband] permitted to disavow the parent-child relationship 
that he created and fostered and to repudiate the parental responsibility that 
flowed from that relationship, [the child] would suffer demonstrable harm fully 
commensurate with her dependent condition”); In re Paternity of C.A.S., 468 
N.W.2d 719, 721, 729 (Wis. 1991) (refusing alleged biological father’s request 
for genetic testing on the grounds that it would be contrary to the children’s best 
interests where the mother’s husband had resided with the children since birth, 
alleged that he was their father, had “been responsible for their emotional and 
financial well-being[,]” and shared a “strong emotional relationship” with the 
children); Wasserman, supra note 42, at 284 (“Courts are quite reluctant to un-
dercut the marital presumption when the mother and her husband have co-
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principles to prevent rebuttal by the birth mother in situations 
in which she had encouraged or demonstrated an intent that her 
spouse assume the role of the child’s parent and the spouse, act-
ing in reliance on the mother’s actions, had in fact functioned in 
that role.108 Similarly, courts have used equitable principles to 
prevent rebuttal by the birth mother’s spouse in situations in 
which the spouse had functioned as the child’s parent, had 
demonstrated through their words or actions an intent to serve 
as the child’s parent, and the child and/or the child’s birth 
mother had relied on those words or actions.109  
In addition, the 2017 Uniform Parentage Act requires a ju-
dicial determination of lack of parental intent and/or function in 
order to proceed with challenges to the marital presumption in 
certain contexts. For example, the Act provides that in order for 
the spouse of a birth mother who conceived via assisted repro-
duction to challenge his or her own presumed parentage within 
two years of the child’s birth, there must be a judicial determi-
nation relating to a lack of parental intent.110 Specifically, the 
 
parented the child, the husband has provided financial and emotional support 
to the child, and the child has bonded with the husband.”). 
 108. See, e.g., In re Marriage of K.E.V., 883 P.2d 1246, 1252 (Mont. 1994) 
(refusing on equitable grounds to allow the mother to rebut the marital pre-
sumption where the husband assumed the role of the child’s parent after the 
mother led him to believe that he was the child’s father and encouraged him to 
act on that belief); Pettinato v. Pettinato, 582 A.2d 909, 912–13 (R.I. 1990) 
(same). Equitable grounds to preclude rebuttal have also been raised in marital 
presumption cases involving same-sex spouses. See, e.g., Barse v. Pasternak, 
No. HHBFA1240305415, 2015 WL 600973, at *14 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 16, 
2015) (“[T]he court finds that the plaintiff in this case may rely upon equitable 
principles in an effort to preclude the defendant from rebutting the marital pre-
sumption and asserting that the plaintiff is not the minor child’s legal parent. 
Whether the plaintiff can sustain her burden of proof is a fact-based inquiry. 
Consequently, an evidentiary hearing would have to be held to determine 
whether the plaintiff has met her burden of establishing that the defendant 
should be precluded from rebutting the marital presumption on equitable 
grounds.”). 
 109. See, e.g., M.H.B., 498 A.2d at 778 (refusing on the grounds of equitable 
estoppel to allow the husband to rebut the marital presumption where he “[b]y 
both deed and word, [ ]  repeatedly and consistently recognized and confirmed 
the parent-child relationship between himself and K.B. [and] acted in every way 
like a father toward his own child”); Manze v. Manze, 523 A.2d 821, 825 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1987) (refusing on the grounds of equitable estoppel to allow the hus-
band to rebut the marital presumption where he “acknowledged [the child] as 
his daughter and assumed the responsibilities of parenthood throughout a ten-
year marriage”).  
 110. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 705. 
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court must determine that the spouse “did not consent to the as-
sisted reproduction, before, on, or after birth of the child . . . .”111 
In addition, in order to commence a challenge to the presumed 
parentage of the spouse of a woman who conceived via assisted 
reproduction after two years have passed since the child’s birth, 
there must be a judicial determination relating to, inter alia, a 
lack of both parental intent and function.112 Namely, the court 
must determine that “(1) the spouse neither provided a gamete 
for, nor consented to, the assisted reproduction; (2) the spouse 
and the woman who gave birth to the child have not cohabited 
since the probable time of assisted reproduction; and (3) the 
spouse never openly held out the child as the spouse’s child.”113 
Even outside of the assisted reproduction context, if a challenge 
is commenced after two years have passed since the child’s birth 
and the child does not have more than one presumed parent, the 
marital presumption cannot be overcome absent a judicial deter-
mination relating to, inter alia, a lack of parental function.114 
Specifically, the court must determine that “the presumed par-
ent is not a genetic parent, never resided with the child, and 
never held out the child as the presumed parent’s child.”115 Fi-
nally, at least one jurisdiction has adopted a rebuttal ground 
that is based purely upon function. Under the law of the District 
of Columbia, one of the grounds for rebuttal of the marital pre-
sumption is that the spouse “did not hold herself out as a parent 
of the child;”116 this ground, however, only applies to actions in-
volving same-sex spouses.117 
 
 111. Id. This standard can also be satisfied if the spouse validly withdrew 
his or her consent. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id.  
 114. Id. § 608. 
 115. Id. § 608(b).  
 116. D.C. CODE § 16-909(b)(2) (2018). The parentage presumption also ap-
plies to domestic partners. Id. §§ (a)(1)–(2). 
 117. Id. While the District of Columbia’s marital presumption statute also 
recognizes the spouse’s lack of genetic connection to the child as a ground for 
rebuttal (applicable to both different- and same-sex couples), the statute in-
structs that courts  
may determine that the presumed parent is the child’s parent, notwith-
standing evidence that the presumed parent is not the child’s genetic 
parent, after giving due consideration to: (A) Whether the conduct of 
the mother or the presumed parent should preclude that party from 
denying parentage; (B) The child’s interests; and (C) The duration and 
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B. PROTECTION OF THE MARITAL FAMILY UNIT FROM OUTSIDE 
INTRUSION, PROMOTION OF MARRIAGE AS THE PREFERRED SITE 
OF PARENTAGE ESTABLISHMENT, AND FURTHERANCE OF 
CHILDREN’S BEST INTERESTS 
Either along with or instead of identifying as the primary 
purpose of the marital presumption providing parentage to the 
person most likely to be the child’s second intended or functional 
parent, states may seek to further the objectives of protecting 
the marital family unit from outside intrusion, promoting mar-
riage as the preferred site for parentage establishment, and/or 
furthering children’s best interests. Identifying the protection of 
the marital family unit from outside intrusion as a core purpose 
of the marital presumption would, for some states, represent less 
of a reconceptualization of the marital presumption. If a state 
identifies the protection of the marital family from outside intru-
sion as a primary purpose of the presumption, the state may 
structure the presumption such that third parties, including an 
individual who alleges that he is the child’s biological father, do 
not having standing to rebut the presumption; instead, only the 
parties to the marriage would have standing. The blanket denial 
of standing to an individual claiming to be the biological father 
of a child born to a person who was married to someone else was 
at one point the approach taken by at least ten states,118 and at 
least six states continue through statute to exclude alleged bio-
logical fathers from the class of individuals granted standing to 
rebut the marital presumption.119  
Methods of furthering the purpose of protecting marital 
families from outside intrusion that are less extreme than a 
blanket denial of standing to third parties would involve nar-
rowly defining the class of third parties granted standing, adopt-
ing rules that disallow or reject third-party challenges where re-
buttal would be contrary to the best interests of the child or the 
 
stability of the relationship between the child, the presumed parent, 
and the genetic parent. 
Id. §§ (b)(1)–(2). 
 118. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 607 cmt. (amended 2017) (“Ten states have 
denied standing to a man claiming to be the father when the mother was mar-
ried to another at the time of the child’s birth. In some of these states, even 
though a presumed father may seek to rebut his presumed paternity, a third-
party male will be denied standing to raise that same issue.”). 
 119. ALA. CODE § 26-17-607(a) (2018); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7540–41 (West 
2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-107(1) (2018); IOWA CODE § 600B.41A(3)(A) 
(2018); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.070(2) (2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-607(1) 
(West 2018). 
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marital family unit, and adopting time limitations for bringing 
third-party challenges. As discussed above, the law in some 
states currently allows courts to deny challenges to the presump-
tion in situations where, although the base requirement for re-
buttal (currently the lack of genetic tie between the spouse and 
child) is satisfied, rebuttal would be contrary to the best inter-
ests of the child.120 In addition, a number of states have adopted 
time limitations on the ability to challenge the marital presump-
tion.121 
If the primary objectives that a state seeks to further 
through the marital presumption include the promotion of mar-
riage as the preferred site of parentage establishment, then the 
state may seek to prevent challenges not only from parties out-
side of the marriage, but also from the parties within the mar-
riage. The most direct way to do this would be to adopt a marital 
presumption that is wholly irrefutable. Under this approach, the 
state would deny standing to challenge the presumption to all 
interested parties, including, inter alia, the individual who gave 
birth, the spouse, the alleged biological father, and the child. 
This type of approach would harken back to the earliest forms of 
the marital presumption, although even then rebuttal was tech-
nically possible (though extremely difficult).122  
There are, of course, less extreme methods of promoting 
marriage as the preferred site of parentage establishment that, 
while not altogether precluding challenges to the parentage of 
the spouse of the individual who gave birth, would limit such 
challenges by making them more difficult to bring or succeed on. 
Just as potential methods of protecting marital family units from 
outside intrusion include limiting the class of individuals 
granted standing to challenge the presumption,123 adopting time 
limitations for making challenges,124 and precluding rebuttal 
where, despite satisfaction of the base requirement, it would be 
contrary to the best interests of the child or marital family 
unit,125 these are also methods of promoting marriage as the pre-
ferred site for the establishment of parentage. Using equitable 
 
 120. See supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text. 
 121. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 122. See supra notes 13–17 and accompanying text. 
 123. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 124. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 125. See supra notes 42, 107. 
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doctrines to deny rebuttal despite satisfaction of the base re-
quirement, which courts in some states already do, is another 
method of limiting parties’ ability to succeed on challenges.126 
Finally, the state may identify the furtherance of children’s 
best interests as a primary purpose of the marital presumption. 
At the extreme, the state could structure the marital presump-
tion such that it focused solely on the furtherance of children’s 
best interests, meaning that rebuttal could occur, regardless of 
the parties’ intent or parental functioning, any time that it was 
viewed as furthering the best interests of the child. The 2017 
Uniform Parentage Act follows a form of this type of approach in 
certain contexts.127 More specifically, with limited exceptions 
that arise in the assisted reproduction context,128 if the pre-
sumed parentage of a birth mother’s spouse who is not the child’s 
genetic parent is challenged within two years of the child’s birth, 
the court proceeds to a best interests of the child analysis to ad-
judicate parentage without any requirement that the court first 
make a determination regarding a lack of parental intent or 
function.129 Other potential methods of advancing the purpose of 
furthering children’s best interests may involve structuring the 
marital presumption with the intent- or function-based focuses 
described above that require for rebuttal, at a minimum, lack of 
mutual intent on the part of the individual who gave birth and/or 
their spouse for the spouse to be the child’s legal parent or lack 
of parental functioning on the part of the spouse.130 This would 
be based on the notion that providing parentage to a spouse who 
is the child’s second intended or functional parent generally 
serves to further children’s best interests.  
Adopting the practice of courts in a number of states, in 
which rebuttal is denied despite satisfaction of the base require-
ment when it would be contrary to the best interests of the child, 
 
 126. See supra notes 108–09. 
 127. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 608, 613 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).  
 128. For example, there is a different standard governing situations in which 
the spouse of a woman who conceives a child via assisted reproduction seeks to 
challenge his or her presumed parentage within two years after the child’s birth. 
See id. § 705. 
 129. Id. § 608. Different standards govern rebuttal actions commenced after 
the child reaches two years of age. See supra notes 113–15 and accompanying 
text. 
 130. See supra Part II.A. 
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is another method states could use to advance the purpose of fur-
thering children’s best interests.131 Similarly, the approach that 
some states have adopted to minimize disruption to children and 
their established families by placing time limitations on chal-
lenges to the presumption represents another potential method 
states could use to advance the purpose of furthering the best 
interests of children.132 If the state believes that children’s best 
interests generally are furthered through the establishment of 
parentage within marriage and the protection of the marital 
family unit from outside intrusion, it could adopt the other meth-
ods discussed above for furthering those objectives, such as re-
stricting standing to bring challenges to the marital presump-
tion or using equitable principles to deny such challenges.133 
III.  STRUCTURING THE MODERN MARITAL 
PRESUMPTION OF PARENTAGE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
REBUTTAL OPTIONS   
This Part will provide an analysis of a number of the options 
available to states for structuring the rebuttal grounds for mod-
ern marital presumptions of parentage. It will first evaluate ap-
proaches to structuring rebuttal of the marital presumption that 
focus on identifying the individual most likely to be the child’s 
second intended or functional parent. It will next assess the var-
ious options available to states for structuring rebuttal of the 
marital presumption in a manner that promotes objectives such 
as protecting the marital family unit from outside intrusion, pro-
moting marriage as the preferred site for parentage establish-
ment, and furthering the best interests of children. Finally, it 
will identify the approach to rebuttal that is likely to be the most 
effective in promoting the primary objectives that states will 
seek to further through a modern marital presumption.  
A. IDENTIFYING THE INDIVIDUAL MOST LIKELY TO BE THE 
CHILD’S SECOND INTENDED OR FUNCTIONAL PARENT 
1. The Intent-Based Approach 
As discussed above, for states that identify granting parent-
age to the individual most likely to be the child’s second intended 
parent as the primary purpose of the marital presumption, 
 
 131. See supra note 44. 
 132. See supra notes 48, 119 and accompanying text. 
 133. See supra notes 118–26 and accompanying text. 
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which posits marriage as a proxy for the spouses’ mutual intent 
to serve as the parents to any children conceived by one of the 
spouses during the marriage, then the grounds for rebuttal 
would focus on proving a lack of mutual intent for the spouse to 
be the child’s legal parent. There are a number of positive attrib-
utes to an intent-based focus for rebuttal of the modern marital 
presumption. As an initial matter, intent-based approaches can 
be “relatively easy to administer and understand.”134 It requires 
analysis of only one question: at the critical point in time, did the 
individual who gave birth and their spouse mutually intend for 
the spouse to be a parent to the child? This is a yes or no ques-
tion, as the intent either did or did not exist at the relevant 
time.135 Furthermore, there are relatively simple steps that the 
parties can take, such as executing a clearly worded written dec-
laration, to create a record of their intentions.  
There is also a strong fairness-based argument that sup-
ports an intent-based approach. Importantly, an intent-based 
approach protects the reliance interests and expectations of the 
spouses stemming from their mutual agreement to become co-
parents.136 In addition, advocates of intent-based approaches 
have maintained that providing parentage to individuals who in-
tended to serve as parents generally promotes children’s best in-
terests.137 This is based on the notion that a person’s demon-
strated intent to become a child’s parent has “great importance 
as indic[ia] of desirable parenting behavior.”138 In this vein, Pro-
fessor Marjorie Shultz has argued that “[h]onoring the plans and 
expectations of adults who will be responsible for a child’s wel-
fare is likely to correlate significantly with positive outcomes for 
parents and children alike.”139  
Moreover, there are some advantages to using an intent-
based approach to rebuttal over a function-based approach. By 
looking at the parties’ intent, as opposed to the degree to which 
 
 134. Shapiro, supra note 87, at 517–18. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Shultz, supra note 32, at 302–03 (“Accordingly, I propose that legal 
rules governing modern procreative arrangements and parental status should 
recognize the importance and the legitimacy of individual efforts to project in-
tentions and decisions into the future. Where such intentions are deliberate, 
explicit and bargained for, where they are the catalyst for reliance and expecta-
tions, as is the case in technologically-assisted reproductive arrangements, they 
should be honored.”). 
 137. Id. at 343. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 397. 
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the spouse functioned as a parent, the intent-based approach 
may be less likely to be marred by differing gender-based stand-
ards and stereotypes, which may be more likely to factor into 
analyses of what it means to “function” as a parent.140 Further-
more, intent can be gauged at a much earlier point than function, 
which generally “requires the passage of time during which the 
adult performs a parental role.”141 As a result, “intentional 
parenthood doctrine[s] permit[] at-birth parentage determina-
tions, whereas functional parenthood requires an analysis at 
some point after a child’s birth.”142 For states whose objectives 
require a strong marital presumption, intent-focused rebuttal 
grounds generally will provide for a significantly stronger mari-
tal presumption than function-focused rebuttal grounds in situ-
ations in which challenges occur at or shortly after the child’s 
birth.  
There are, however, some significant drawbacks to an in-
tent-based approach to rebuttal of the marital presumption, and 
there are a number of important questions states would need to 
answer in adopting such an approach. Specifically, “a number of 
contested cases have demonstrated [that] intent can be an elu-
sive, imprecise, and mutating variable.”143 Intent is not always 
neatly set forth in a written document, and there may still be 
disputes about the meaning of written documents even when 
they do exist.144 Where parties are not in agreement regarding 
the issue of intent, courts may be left to engage in a messy fact-
based analysis to determine whether there was mutual intent 
for the spouse to be the child’s legal parent.145 Moreover, intent 
 
 140. See Baker, supra note 71, at 138 (“Cases to date make clear that when 
using functional approaches to parenthood . . . judges import gendered, dyadic 
and often genetic understandings of what family is and what families do.”). 
 141. Appleton, supra note 8, at 274. 
 142. Jacobs, supra note 32, at 466. 
 143. Appleton, supra note 8, at 282. 
 144. K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 682 (Cal. 2005); Jason P. v. Danielle S., 171 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 789, 797–98 (Ct. App. 2014); D.M.T. v. T.M.H., 129 So. 3d 320, 
345–47 (Fla. 2013); In re Adoption of Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d 677, 689 n.44 
(N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2009). 
 145. See, e.g., K.M., 117 P.3d at 676 (discussing how one of the parties “tes-
tified that she and [her former partner] planned to raise the child together, 
while [the partner] insisted that . . . [she] made it clear that her intention was 
to become ‘a single parent’”); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 542 (N.J. 2000) (not-
ing that one party claimed that “she made the final decision to become pregnant 
independently and before beginning her relationship with” her partner, while 
her partner “claimed that the parties jointly decided to have children”); Belsito 
v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 764 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1994) (“Intent can be difficult to 
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is not a fixed concept; rather, parties’ intentions can change sig-
nificantly over time.146 In addition, intent-based approaches, 
which may be satisfied by the mere execution of a document, may 
not be as closely tied to the promotion of children’s best interests 
as function-based approaches, which focus on whether the indi-
vidual actually supported and formed a parental relationship 
with the child. As a result, some scholars argue that function is 
a more deserving ground for parentage establishment.147  
The factual scenario presented in K.M. v. E.G. demonstrates 
some of the significant difficulties that can arise in an intent-
based approach to parentage determinations.148 There, after the 
parties’ relationship ended, K.M. sought to establish parental 
rights to the children to whom her former partner, E.G., had 
given birth via in vitro fertilization using K.M.’s ova.149 Although 
the trial court found that the parties had raised the children, 
who were five years old at the time of trial, together in their joint 
home from birth, K.M. had “treated the twins in all regards as 
though they were her own,” and there was “no question . . . that 
[the children were] fully bonded to her as such,” the issue of the 
 
prove. Even when the parties have a written agreement, disagreements as to 
intent can arise.”); Dara E. Purvis, Intended Parents and the Problem of Per-
spective, 24 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 210, 249 (2012) (“One of the chief problems 
with potential use of intent as a parentage regime is that intent to be a parent 
is difficult to express.”). 
 146. For example, there are numerous cases demonstrating this in the con-
text of a same-sex couple wherein the partners mutually plan for and intend to 
co-parent the child conceived by one of the partners through assisted reproduc-
tion, but the partner who is the child’s biological parent later changes her mind. 
See, e.g., In re C.B.L., 723 N.E.2d 316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); A.H. v. M.P., 857 
N.E.2d 1061 (Mass. 2006); Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991); 
Liston v. Pyles, No. 97APF01-137, 1997 WL 467327, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 
12, 1997); In re Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 913 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999); Jones v. Bar-
low, 154 P.3d 808 (Utah 2007); In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 
1995). Of course, intentions change in situations involving different-sex couples 
as well. See, e.g., Jason P., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 797–98; Patton v. Vanterpool, 
806 S.E.2d 493 (Ga. 2017). 
 147. See generally Appleton, supra note 8, at 284 (“In sum, I reject both ge-
netics and intent alone to determine parentage in favor of a functional test.”); 
Nancy E. Dowd, From Genes, Marriage and Money to Nurture: Redefining Fa-
therhood, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 132, 134 (2003) (“Specifically, I argue that 
fatherhood should be defined by doing (action) instead of being (status), with 
the critical component being acts of nurturing.” (emphasis omitted)); Shapiro, 
supra note 87, at 520 (“Mere intention cannot outweigh performance, or the lack 
thereof.”). 
 148. 117 P.3d at 673. 
 149. Id. at 675. 
 
276 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:243 
 
parties’ intent at the time of conception was hotly contested.150 
E.G. claimed that she had planned to become a parent before 
meeting K.M., and that although K.M. had been supportive and 
had accompanied E.G. to most of her appointments at the fertil-
ity clinic, E.G. had made it clear that “her intention was to be-
come a ‘single parent.’”151 K.M., however, testified that the par-
ties intended to raise any child resulting from E.G.’s fertility 
treatments together.152 After the parties began living together 
and registered as domestic partners, E.G.’s doctor suggested that 
E.G. use K.M.’s ova to conceive since E.G. was unable to produce 
sufficient ova.153 E.G. claimed that she told K.M. she would only 
accept K.M.’s ova if K.M. was truly willing to be a donor and 
would not even consider allowing K.M. to adopt the child until 
five years had passed.154 K.M., on the other hand, claimed that 
she only provided her ova because she and E.G. had agreed to 
raise any resulting child together.155 Although K.M. signed a Do-
nor Consent Form in which she waived any rights to the children 
resulting from her ova, she testified that she did not believe cer-
tain parts of the form pertained to her, did not intend to relin-
quish her parental rights, and thought she was going to be a par-
ent.156 The parties informed K.M.’s father of the pregnancy by 
“announcing that he was going to be a grandfather.”157 
The trial court held that K.M. did not qualify as a parent, 
finding that the parties had agreed prior to conception that E.G. 
would be the sole parent of the children and that K.M. had 
“knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently executed the ovum do-
nor form, thereby . . . relinquishing and waiving all rights to 
claim legal parentage.”158 Accordingly, K.M.’s position was akin 
to that of a sperm donor.159 The appellate court affirmed, holding 
that “substantial evidence supports the trial court’s factual find-
ing that only E.G. intended to bring about the birth of a child 
whom she intended to raise as her own.”160 The Supreme Court 
 
 150. Id. at 675–77 (emphasis omitted). 
 151. Id. at 676. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 675–76. 
 154. Id. at 676. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 677. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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of California reversed, determining that the state’s gamete do-
nation statute did not apply to situations in which a woman do-
nates ova to her partner in order to produce children to be raised 
in their joint home.161 The court further determined that because 
K.M. was seeking to be named the child’s parent in addition to, 
as opposed to instead of, E.G., the court did not need to use an 
intent-based standard to determine which party was the legal 
parent.162 Instead, each party could establish her legal parent-
age on a basis other than intent: K.M. could establish parentage 
based on her genetic connection to the children and E.G. could 
establish parentage based on the act of giving birth.163 The court 
noted that the conflicting testimony presented in the case made 
it a good example of why basing “the determination of parentage 
upon a later judicial determination of intent made years after 
the birth of the child” would be problematic in terms of the pro-
motion of predictability.164 This case demonstrates the difficulty 
in determining the parties’ intent when there is conflicting tes-
timony. It also highlights the risk that an intent-based approach 
to rebuttal of the marital presumption may result in the denial 
of parentage to a spouse who has functioned as a child’s parent 
and has formed a deeply bonded parental relationship with the 
child, since, unlike in K.M., in most cases involving same-sex 
couples the spouse of the individual who gave birth will not share 
a genetic connection with the child.165 
Another potential concern regarding the intent-based ap-
proach is that it may result in the disestablishment of parentage 
for the spouse of the individual who gave birth, even in situa-
tions where the spouse is the child’s biological parent. This could 
result in fewer children having two legal parents from whom to 
receive support, something which is contrary to the goals of state 
and federal parentage laws.166 In most cases involving different-
sex couples, the birth mother’s spouse is also the child’s biologi-
cal father.167 The notion that the marital presumption could be 
overcome in this situation through proof that the individual who 
gave birth or their spouse did not actually intend for the spouse 
 
 161. Id. at 680. 
 162. Id. at 681. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 682. 
 165. See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B, 748 A.2d 539, 542 (N.J. 2000). 
 166. Feinberg, supra note 8, at 104. 
 167. Baker, supra note 49, at 1659 (“The best estimates suggest that the 
presumed father is not the biological father in 10–15% of [marital] births.”). 
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to serve as a legal parent will seem deeply problematic to many 
people at first glance given that genetic parents generally have 
parental duties168 and rights169 with regard to the children they 
produce regardless of intent in situations in which the genetic 
parent is not a gamete donor and the individual who gives birth 
is not married to someone else. There is, however, a relatively 
straightforward solution to this potential problem. All states al-
ready have laws and procedures governing the establishment of 
parentage for biological parents who are not gamete donors in 
situations in which the marital presumption does not govern.170 
As a result, even if the marital presumption is rebutted on in-
tent-based grounds, in the same legal proceeding the spouse’s 
legal parentage could be established on an independent basis 
through the existing (or similar) standards and procedures for 
establishing legal parentage for genetic parents who are not 
gamete donors. 
However, there are still a number of important questions 
that will need to be answered by states that adopt intent-based 
approaches to the marital presumption. Because intent can 
change over time, it will be necessary to designate the critical 
time when intent should be gauged. Under the existing intent-
based approaches that govern the parentage of children con-
ceived through assisted reproduction, generally the key time at 
which the requisite intent must exist is at the time that the as-
sisted reproduction procedure is undertaken.171 The idea is that 
 
 168. See Feinberg, supra note 8, at 117–18 (“Importantly, in order to receive 
critical federal funding, states must establish child support procedures that re-
quire the child and alleged father to submit to genetic testing when it is re-
quested by a party who is seeking to establish or deny the paternity of the al-
leged father. Furthermore, the state procedures also must ‘create a rebuttable 
or, at the option of the State, conclusive presumption of paternity upon genetic 
testing results indicating a threshold probability that the alleged father is the 
father of the child.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(G) (2012))). 
 169. With regard to parental rights when the marital presumption does not 
govern, under current Supreme Court precedent, “in order for an unmarried 
man to establish a constitutionally protected relationship with his offspring un-
der the biology plus standard, he must demonstrate both a sufficient commit-
ment to parenthood and a shared biological relationship with the child.” Id. at 
117. However, this precedent refers to unmarried biological fathers, and it is 
possible that courts will determine that the biological parent of a child born into 
his or her existing marriage has a constitutionally protected relationship with 
the child without regard to whether he or she has demonstrated a sufficient 
commitment to parenthood.  
 170. Id. at 117–18. 
 171. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-774 (2018) (“Any child or children 
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the inquiry should focus on whether the parties engaged in a 
joint enterprise that led to the child’s conception.172 Under this 
type of approach, subsequent to the designated point in time, 
“intent is fixed and variation in the actual intentions of the par-
ties may fluctuate without legal consequence attaching.”173 This, 
however, begs an important question: in situations where the 
spouses’ mutual intent for the spouse to be the child’s legal par-
ent forms at a later point, such as during the pregnancy, at the 
time of the child’s birth, or after the child’s birth, why is that 
intent less important to establishing parentage than the intent 
 
born as a result of A.I.D. shall be deemed to acquire, in all respects, the status 
of a naturally conceived legitimate child of the husband and wife who consented 
to and requested the use of A.I.D.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21 (2018) (“All chil-
dren born within wedlock or within the usual period of gestation thereafter who 
have been conceived by means of artificial insemination are irrebuttably pre-
sumed legitimate if both spouses have consented in writing to the use and ad-
ministration of artificial insemination.”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2302 (2018) 
(“Any child or children heretofore or hereafter born as the result of heterologous 
artificial insemination shall be considered at law in all respects the same as a 
naturally conceived child of the husband and wife so requesting and consenting 
to the use of such technique.”); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73(1) (McKinney 2018) 
(“Any child born to a married woman by means of artificial insemination per-
formed by persons duly authorized to practice medicine and with the consent in 
writing of the woman and her husband, shall be deemed the legitimate, birth 
child of the husband and his wife for all purposes.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 
(2018) (“Any child or children born as the result of heterologous artificial insem-
ination shall be considered at law in all respects the same as a naturally con-
ceived legitimate child of the husband and wife requesting and consenting in 
writing to the use of such technique.”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 552 (2018) 
(“Any child or children born as the result thereof shall be considered at law in 
all respects the same as a naturally conceived legitimate child of the husband 
and wife so requesting and consenting to the use of such technique.”); Purvis, 
supra note 145, at 229–30 (“Most scholars discussing intent as a parentage re-
gime have focused on the moment of conception as the determinative point. 
Statutes establishing that the husband of a married woman who undergoes ar-
tificial insemination is the legal father of any resulting child so long as he con-
sented to the AI procedure also take this conception-centered view.”). 
 172. Appleton, supra note 8, at 277 (explaining that “intentions loom large 
in [the assisted reproduction] context because they constitute a but-for cause of 
the existence of the very child in question”); Purvis, supra note 145, at 227 (“The 
[intent] theory is straightforward: the law grants parental rights and responsi-
bilities to those who caused a child to come into being with the intent of parent-
ing that child once it was born.” (internal quotations omitted)); Shapiro, supra 
note 87, at 517 (“The joint enterprise approach is premised upon an intent-based 
test, where intent is manifested by signing up for the enterprise. This is the 
critical moment at which intent is or is not established. Once manifested, intent 
creates legally recognized interests in parenthood.” (footnote omitted)). 
 173. Shapiro, supra note 87, at 517. 
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that existed at or before the time of conception? After all, in the 
context of VAPs, it is the parties’ mutual intent at the time of 
the child’s birth that establishes parentage for the child’s second 
parent.174 Perhaps, as some scholars have suggested, the expres-
sion of mutual intent for the spouse to be the child’s legal parent 
at any point should be sufficient to prevent rebuttal of the pre-
sumption.175 From the perspective of a child who views the 
spouse as his or her second parent, it is likely irrelevant whether 
the intent formed prior to or after conception.176 Consequently, 
while some states may follow the approach taken in the assisted 
reproduction context and require that the requisite intent exist 
at an earlier point, other states may adopt an approach that rec-
ognizes post-conception intent. Recognizing post-conception in-
tent may be particularly attractive to states that are interested 
in creating a marital presumption that is more difficult to rebut 
in order to further objectives such as promoting the establish-
ment of parentage within marriage and the protection of mar-
riage from outside intrusion.177  
Another important question that will arise in the context of 
intent-based approaches is whether the common grounds for vi-
tiating consent in the contracts context, such as duress, fraud, 
and material mistake of fact, will be available for proving lack of 
intent for purposes of rebutting the marital presumption.178 In 
the context of VAPs, following the 60-day rescission period, chal-
lenges may be made only on the grounds of duress, fraud, and 
 
 174. See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text.  
 175. See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball, Rendering Children Illegitimate in Former 
Partner Parenting Cases: Hiding Behind the Facade of Certainty, 20 AM. U.J. 
GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 623, 661 (2012) (“In fact, it is unclear why the intent 
to become a parent should be legally relevant only if it takes place before the 
child’s conception. Whether that intent existed, and whether it was demon-
strated through particular understandings and conduct, would seem to be more 
important than its precise timing . . . .” (emphasis omitted)). 
 176. Id. at 660–61. 
 177. This would be somewhat similar to the approach adopted by the 2017 
Uniform Parentage Act in the context of consent to assisted reproduction, which 
prohibits a spouse from challenging his or her parentage if the consent occurred 
on, after, or before the child’s birth. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 705 (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 2017). Moreover, the Uniform Parentage Act establishes parentage for 
anyone who consents in writing to a woman’s use of assisted reproduction with 
the intent to be a parent to any resulting children before, on, or after the birth 
of the child. Id. § 704. 
 178. Shultz, supra note 32, at 346–69 (suggesting the use of contract law 
protections in assessing claims of intentional parenthood). 
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material mistake of fact.179 Notably, the most common chal-
lenges to VAPs are based upon claims of fraud or material mis-
take of fact stemming from a lack of genetic connection between 
the putative father and child.180 One major concern in allowing 
these grounds to demonstrate a lack of intent would be that they 
could bring back as a central aspect of the rebuttal analysis the 
issue of the spouse’s genetic ties to the child, which would render 
the presumption problematic when applied to same-sex couples. 
This is not a major concern, however, as in the context of a same-
sex parent who lacks genetic connections to the child conceived 
by her partner, both members of the couple generally would be 
aware of the spouse’s lack of genetic connection to the child from 
the outset. As a result, generally neither party would be able to 
use arguments for fraud or material mistake of fact stemming 
from the spouse’s lack of genetic ties to the child to prove a lack 
of intent.  
2. The Function-Based Approach 
As discussed above, for states that identify granting parent-
age to the individual most likely to function as the child’s second 
parent as the primary purpose of the marital presumption, 
which posits marriage as a proxy for the willingness to under-
take a parental role to any child conceived by or born to one’s 
spouse during the marriage, rebutting the presumption would 
focus on proving that the spouse of the individual who gave birth 
had not functioned in a parental role to the child. There are a 
number of positive attributes to a function-based focus for rebut-
tal of the modern marital presumption. Perhaps the most im-
portant attribute of a functional approach relates to its focus on 
the relationship between the child and adult in question and the 
role that the adult plays in the child’s life, providing a clear, di-
rect tie to the promotion of children’s best interests. For children, 
attachment relationships develop from an adult’s “provision of 
physical and emotional care, continuity or consistency in the 
child’s life and emotional investment in the child.”181 There is 
 
 179. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., OEI-
06-98-00053, PATERNITY ESTABLISHMENT, USE OF VOLUNTARY PATERNITY AC-
KNOWLEDGMENTS 1 (2000), https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-06-98-00053.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E65G-ECQ6]. 
 180. Harris, supra note 71, at 479. 
 181. Linda D. Elrod, A Child’s Perspective of Defining a Parent: The Case for 
Intended Parenthood, 25 BYU J. PUB. L. 245, 249 (2011). 
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extensive research demonstrating that disruption of the attach-
ment relationships formed between children and the individuals 
who function as their parents can lead to significant short- and 
long-term harm to children.182 Notably, “[o]nce an adult has 
lived with and cared for a child for an extended period of time 
and become that child’s psychological parent, removing that ‘par-
ent’ from the child’s life results in emotional distress in the child 
and a setback of ongoing development.”183 The effects of this dis-
ruption can be significant enough that they may even follow the 
child into adulthood.184 Overall, the tie to the promotion of chil-
dren’s best interests is arguably significantly more direct in 
functional, as compared to intent-based, approaches to parent-
age determinations.  
There are also fairness arguments that support a function-
based analysis. Notably, the equitable parenthood doctrines dis-
cussed above generally require not only the existence of a 
bonded, parent-like relationship between the petitioner and the 
child, the assumption of the obligations of parenthood on behalf 
of the petitioner, and the sharing of a household between the pe-
titioner and child, but also that the child’s legal parent consented 
to and/or encouraged the formation of the parent-like relation-
ship between the child and the petitioner.185 Providing parent-
age based upon this type of functional analysis therefore protects 
the reasonable expectations and reliance interests of an individ-
ual who, with the legal parent’s consent and/or encouragement, 
took on the role of the child’s parent. Furthermore, these strict 
 
 182. Frank J. Dyer, Termination of Parental Rights in Light of Attachment 
Theory: The Case of Kaylee, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 5, 11 (2004) (“In sum, 
there are numerous empirical findings that provide a solid research basis for 
predictions of long-term harm associated with disrupted attachment and loss of 
a child’s central parental love objects.”); Elrod, supra note 181, at 250–51 (“Con-
tinuity of the parent-child relationship is essential to the child’s overall well-
being. When an attachment relationship is severed by one parent dropping out 
of a child’s life, the child suffers emotional and psychological harm. Disrupting 
attachments can turn a securely attached child into an insecure one.”); Rebecca 
L. Scharf, Psychological Parentage, Troxel, and the Best Interests of the Child, 
13 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 615, 634 (2012) (“Studies confirm that the loss of—or 
sudden, long-term separation from—an attachment figure creates significant 
psychological harm in children and can ‘seriously injure and fragment an indi-
vidual’s sense of self.’” (footnotes omitted)). 
 183. Scharf, supra note 182, at 634. 
 184. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE 
CHILD 33–34 (1973). 
 185. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
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requirements for satisfying equitable parenthood doctrines en-
sure that satisfaction of such doctrines occurs in only truly com-
pelling circumstances. 
There is also the benefit of conceptual parity in a system 
that focuses on function in determining the parentage of the 
spouse of the individual who gave birth. Traditionally, the law 
has bestowed parentage to individuals who give birth as “a mat-
ter of course.”186 With the advancements in gamete donation and 
assisted reproduction, however, the justification for this can no 
longer be that there is necessarily a genetic connection between 
the individual who gives birth and the child. However, the auto-
matic bestowment of parentage to individuals who give birth can 
still be justified on the grounds that this individual will have 
satisfied a functional analysis by carrying and giving birth to the 
child.187 Consequently, focusing on function for purposes of re-
butting the marital presumption establishes a degree of parity 
between the parentage analyses for individuals who give birth 
and their spouses.188 
There are, however, some significant drawbacks to a func-
tion-based approach to rebuttal of the marital presumption, and 
there are a number of important questions states would need to 
answer in adopting such an approach. Arguments against ap-
proaches to parentage determinations that focus on function, 
such as equitable parenthood doctrines, are based upon claims 
that the standards employed in such analyses, which in essence 
ask whether someone has performed in a role and formed a rela-
tionship with the child that is sufficiently “parent-like,” are com-
plicated, fact-intensive, nonobjective, and lead to unpredictable 
results.189 Critics of equitable parenthood doctrines have argued 
 
 186. Meyer, supra note 14, at 127. 
 187. Appleton, supra note 8, at 275 (“[T]he woman gestating the preg-
nancy . . . will always have met the [functional] test, given the unique parental 
functions she has performed during pregnancy, including prenatal shelter, nur-
ture, sustenance, and protection of the child-to-be.”). 
 188. See Shapiro, supra note 87, at 523 (“Finally, the attraction of a single 
theory of parenthood governing all domains is not only grounded in an appeal 
to uniformity or consistency, but it is grounded in the observation that all legal 
parents have something in common—that there are reasons we bestow on them 
the rights and obligations that we do. That commonality is the relationship be-
tween adult and child that is the core of the functional model.”). 
 189. See Baker, supra note 71, at 165 (“Functional parent claims are almost 
always bitter, fact-bound contests that leave the parties emotionally and finan-
cially depleted. Regardless of whether courts focus on A, B, or C, when courts 
look to the past behavior of the parties, in light of what is inevitably conflicting 
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that the standards employed lead to protracted, contentious, and 
costly litigation.190 Moreover, because of the complex, fact-inten-
sive nature of the analysis, it generally will be quite difficult for 
someone to pinpoint the moment when they have satisfied a 
function-based standard, meaning that spouses who rely on the 
marital presumption as the source of their parentage may expe-
rience insecurity with regard to their legal status in relation to 
the child.191 Additionally, as noted above, there is a significant 
risk that gender-based stereotypes will factor into judicial anal-
yses of what it means to “function” as a parent.192 
There also are fairness related issues with a function-based 
approach to rebuttal. Significant concerns regarding the protec-
tion of reasonable expectations and reliance interests arise in 
situations in which the spouses engaged in a joint endeavor to 
bring the child into the world with the mutual intent and under-
standing that they would be the child’s legal parents, but one 
party later changes his or her mind. In that situation, if it was 
the individual who gave birth who changed their mind, that in-
dividual could succeed in creating grounds for rebuttal of the 
marital presumption if they prevented their spouse from func-
tioning as the child’s parent. If instead it was the spouse of the 
individual who gave birth who changed his or her mind, he or 
she could succeed in creating grounds for rebuttal by refusing to 
engage in parental functions.  
The factual scenario presented in T.F. v. B.L. demonstrates 
some of the significant limitations of a function-based approach 
to parentage determinations.193 There, T.F. sought an order to 
require her former partner, B.L., to pay child support.194 The 
couple had begun living together in 1996 and held a commitment 
 
testimony from the parties about their previous intentions, devotions and ac-
tions, what courts get are protracted, ugly court battles with children at the 
center.”); Shapiro, supra note 87, at 518 (“[T]he issue that must be resolved [in 
functional parenthood approaches]—whether a person acted like a parent for a 
long enough period of time—is difficult and brings with it layers of complication 
and uncertainty.”). 
 190. See, e.g., Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 192 (N.Y. 2010) (stating 
that equitable parenthood determinations “are likely often to be contentious, 
costly, and lengthy”). 
 191. Shapiro, supra note 87, at 518 (“You do not know when you have at-
tained functional parenthood.”). 
 192. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 193. T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244 (Mass. 2004). 
 194. Id. at 1246. 
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ceremony in 1999195 (same-sex marriage had not yet been legal-
ized).196 A month or two after the couple’s commitment cere-
mony, B.L., who had previously expressed reluctance about be-
coming a parent, called T.F. and stated that she had changed her 
mind about having a child with T.F.197 The parties then together 
attended T.F.’s appointments at a fertility clinic, chose a sperm 
donor, and used joint funds for the expenses arising from T.F.’s 
fertility treatments and prenatal care.198 During T.F.’s preg-
nancy, however, the parties separated.199 Although B.L. visited 
T.F. and the child a few times while they were in the hospital, 
approximately four months after the child’s birth B.L. sent T.F. 
a letter stating that she did not wish to have further contact with 
T.F. or the child.200 The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that 
the evidence warranted the trial court’s finding that the parties, 
by their words and conduct, had entered into an implied contract 
under which B.L. agreed to “undertake the responsibilities of a 
parent in consideration of [T.F.’s] conceiving and bearing a 
child.”201 However, if the parties in this case had been married 
and a function-based approach to rebuttal of the marital pre-
sumption had been in place, B.L., who refused to interact with 
the child to any significant extent (let alone engage in parental 
functioning),202 almost certainly could have avoided being 
deemed a legal parent despite the credible evidence of the par-
ties’ mutual intent at the time of conception to serve as the par-
ents of any resulting child. While if the spouse shares a genetic 
tie to the child his or her parentage could be established on sep-
arate genetics-based grounds even if the marital presumption 
was successfully rebutted,203 this would not eliminate the prob-
lem where the spouse is not a genetic parent and parentage could 
not be established through the state’s laws governing spousal 
consent to assisted reproduction procedures.204  
 
 195. Id. at 1246–47. 
 196. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003) 
(legalizing same-sex marriage in Massachusetts). 
 197. T.F., 813 N.E.2d at 1247. 
 198. Id.  
 199. Id. at 1247–48. 
 200. Id. at 1248. 
 201. Id. at 1249. The court ultimately refused to enforce the contract on pub-
lic policy grounds. Id. at 1249–52. 
 202. Id. at 1248. 
 203. See supra notes 166–70 and accompanying text. 
 204. See JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 54, § 3:6 (“Courts have reached different 
conclusions with regard to whether the person is a legal parent of a child born 
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In addition, establishing functional parentage usually re-
quires post-birth conduct.205 As a result, a party seeking to rebut 
the marital presumption may be able to do so merely by initiat-
ing an action immediately following the child’s birth. Although 
some scholars have argued that a spouse could potentially sat-
isfy a functional test based solely upon actions taken prior to 
birth, even if that were allowed under the state’s law, satisfying 
this type of test would undoubtedly be much more difficult in 
situations in which the rebuttal action was brought shortly after 
the child’s birth.206 This leads to an important question that 
must be answered by states that adopt a function-based ap-
proach to rebuttal of the marital presumption: can an individual 
be considered to have functioned as a parent based solely upon 
pre-birth conduct?207 On the one hand, allowing pre-birth con-
duct alone to establish functional parentage would be a signifi-
cant departure from the existing function-based approaches to 
parental rights. The function-based doctrines that states have 
adopted, such as equitable parenthood doctrines and holding out 
presumptions, explicitly require post-birth conduct on the part 
of the individual whose parentage is being determined.208 While 
conduct that occurs prior to birth, such as supporting the person 
carrying the child during the pregnancy, can further children’s 
best interests, protection of the relationship between the child 
and an individual who has established an actual parental bond 
with the child and who has provided support and caretaking di-
rectly to the child is arguably more directly tied to the promotion 
of children’s best interests.  
 
to the woman through alternative insemination where the parties failed to com-
ply strictly with the . . . statutory requirements.”). 
 205. See supra notes 141–42 and accompanying text. 
 206. See Appleton, supra note 8, at 273–74 (“[T]he focus on function typically 
requires the passage of time during which the adult performs a parental role.”). 
 207. Compare Shapiro, supra note 87, at 521 (“Can anyone else function as 
parent, or in whatever analogous capacity there might be for a child while in 
utero? Though I have not fully worked this through, it seems to me it may be 
hard to say yes. No matter how diligently one attends the Lamaze classes, one 
is not fully going to meet the functional test. Thus, consistent application of a 
functional test will mean that children have but one parent at birth.”), with 
Appleton, supra note 8, at 276 (stating that a functional standard could be sat-
isfied by an individual’s actions of “supporting the woman (financially and emo-
tionally) during her pregnancy, assisting her with prenatal care, and otherwise 
acting as [a] fully involved [parent] of the fetus”). 
 208. See supra notes 98–103 and accompanying text. 
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On the other hand, allowing pre-birth conduct alone to es-
tablish functional parentage would mean that a party would not 
be able to ensure rebuttal success simply by bringing an action 
shortly after the child’s birth.209 Moreover, while protecting the 
relationship between the child and someone who has engaged 
only in pre-birth parental conduct is arguably less directly tied 
to the furtherance of children’s best interests than protecting the 
relationship between the child and someone who has functioned 
as a parent post-birth, providing parentage to an individual who 
has demonstrated, though their pre-birth conduct, a strong com-
mitment to supporting the child and assuming a parental role 
may still be very beneficial to the promotion of children’s best 
interests. In terms of fairness, allowing pre-birth conduct alone 
to satisfy the functional parentage analysis would protect the re-
liance interests of an individual who engages in a joint venture 
with his or her spouse to become parents and who, prior to the 
child’s birth, has acted in a manner consistent with his or her 
reasonable expectations regarding that joint venture. Finally, 
because it makes rebuttal more difficult, states that wish to cre-
ate strong marital presumptions in order to protect marriages 
from intrusion and/or promote the establishment of parentage 
within marriage may opt for an approach that recognizes that 
pre-birth conduct alone may establish a spouse’s functional par-
entage. 
3. Combined Intent- and Function-Based Approach 
As the previous discussion indicates, there are pros and cons 
to choosing an intent-based approach to parentage determina-
tions over a function-based approach and vice versa. In many 
cases, the approaches will lead to the same result because 
“[f]unction will confirm previously stated intention.”210 However, 
 
 209. See supra notes 205–06 and accompanying text. 
 210. Shapiro, supra note 87, at 518–19 (“In many, if not most cases, intent 
and function will work together.”). There is certainly some overlap between the 
considerations inherent in intent- and function-based approaches to parentage. 
As Professor Katharine Baker has explained, “[s]ome inquiry into intent to 
share parenting is embedded in how courts evaluate function, perhaps because 
unless there is intent to share parenting rights and obligations, it is hard for 
two people to function as if they actually are sharing those rights and obliga-
tions.” Baker, supra note 71, at 136. However, mutual intent for the individual 
in question to form a parent-like relationship with the child or perform a parent-
like role is not necessarily the same as mutual intent for the individual to be 
the child’s legal parent. 
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this, of course, will not always be the case.211 There will undoubt-
edly be situations in which either a spouse has functioned as a 
child’s parent despite the lack of mutual intention at the rele-
vant time for the spouse to be the child’s legal parent, as demon-
strated in K.M. v. E.G.,212 or a spouse has not functioned as a 
child’s parent despite the existence of mutual intent at the rele-
vant time for the spouse to be the child’s legal parent, as demon-
strated in T.F. v. B.L.213 If a state decides that the intent- and 
function-based standards both further desirable objectives, it 
might adopt an approach to the marital presumption that com-
bines them.214 
Specifically, another option for structuring the marital pre-
sumption would be to require the party seeking to rebut the pre-
sumption to prove both that there was no mutual intent at the 
critical time between the parties for the spouse to be the child’s 
legal parent and that the spouse had not functioned as the child’s 
parent as defined by the common standard utilized in equitable 
parenthood doctrines.215 This approach would alleviate a num-
ber of the problems discussed above that may arise under ap-
proaches based solely on intent or function.216 For example, in 
terms of alleviating some of the problems inherent in a function-
based approach, under the combination approach, if the spouses 
engaged in a joint endeavor to bring the child into the world with 
the mutual intent and understanding that they would be the 
child’s parents but one of the parties later changed his or her 
mind, the party who gave birth would not be able to create re-
buttal grounds simply by denying their spouse the opportunity 
to function as parent and the spouse would not be able to create 
rebuttal grounds simply by refusing to function as parent. Simi-
 
 211. See Shapiro, supra note 87, at 519. 
 212. See supra notes 148–64 and accompanying text. 
 213. See supra notes 193–201 and accompanying text. 
 214. One of the approaches to rebuttal of the marital presumption set forth 
in the 2017 Uniform Parentage Act is a combined intent- and function-based 
approach, but this approach applies only in limited circumstances. See supra 
notes 112–13 and accompanying text. 
 215. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (describing the standard as 
requiring the satisfaction of four elements, including that the petitioner resided 
with the child, assumed the responsibilities of parenthood, and formed a parent-
like relationship with the child, and that the child’s legal parent consented to or 
encouraged the formation of the parent-like relationship between the petitioner 
and child). 
 216. See supra Part III.A. 
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larly, it would ensure that an individual could not create rebut-
tal grounds merely by bringing the action immediately after the 
child’s birth, when it would be difficult or impossible for the 
spouse to have sufficiently functioned as a parent. It would also 
decrease the risk that gender-based stereotypes about what it 
means to function as a mother or father would play a determina-
tive role in court decisions involving challenges to the marital 
presumption.  
At the same time, in terms of alleviating some of the prob-
lems inherent in an intent-based approach, under the combina-
tion approach the absence of mutual intent for the spouse to be 
the child’s legal parent at some specific point in time would not 
result in the denial of parentage to a spouse who had, with the 
encouragement of the individual who gave birth, formed a pa-
rental bond with the child, the disruption of which could lead to 
short- and long-term harm to the child. Moreover, since there are 
arguments that both intent- and function-based approaches to 
parentage promote children’s best interests, adopting a standard 
that precludes rebuttal unless it can be shown that the spouse 
was neither an intentional nor functional parent would arguably 
go further in promoting the best interests of children than choos-
ing one approach to the exclusion of the other. In addition, de-
pending on the facts involved in a given situation, there will 
likely be times when application of one of the approaches to re-
buttal (intent or function) would lead to a complex, messy anal-
ysis from the court, while the other would not. In situations in 
which it is clear that rebuttal will be precluded under one of the 
approaches, but application of the other would be a complex un-
dertaking, providing courts with the ability to deny rebuttal 
based solely on one of the approaches would allow the court in 
such situations to engage in a more straightforward analysis 
that may result in fewer instances of costly and protracted par-
entage proceedings. Finally, for states whose chosen objectives 
support the adoption of a stronger marital presumption, requir-
ing proof of both lack of mutual intent and lack of function may 
be a desirable option since it makes rebuttal significantly more 
difficult and unlikely. 
There are, however, potential downsides to adopting an ap-
proach to rebuttal that requires proof of both a lack of mutual 
intent on behalf of the parties for the spouse to be the child’s 
parent and a lack of parental functioning on behalf of the spouse. 
To the extent that either an intent- or function-based standard 
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is over-inclusive in that it sometimes allows for parentage estab-
lishment in what a jurisdiction deems as undesirable circum-
stances, precluding rebuttal on the basis that either one of the 
two standards is satisfied would only exacerbate the problem. 
Furthermore, this approach may be viewed as undesirable in ju-
risdictions that have provided increasing protections to the 
rights of biological fathers who are not married to the individual 
who gave birth. This is because if rebuttal requires proving both 
that the individual who gave birth and their spouse did not in-
tend for the spouse to be the child’s parent and that the spouse 
has not functioned as the child’s parent, biological fathers of chil-
dren born to married individuals will face a steep uphill battle 
in rebutting the marital presumption and establishing parent-
age. 
B. PROTECTING THE MARITAL FAMILY UNIT FROM OUTSIDE 
INTRUSION, PROMOTING PARENTAGE ESTABLISHMENT WITHIN 
MARRIAGE, AND FURTHERING THE BEST INTERESTS OF CHILDREN 
Either along with or instead of identifying the purpose of the 
marital presumption as providing parentage to the person most 
likely to be the child’s second intended or functional parent, 
states may seek to further the objectives of protecting the mari-
tal family unit from outside intrusion, promoting marriage as 
the preferred site for parentage establishment, and/or furthering 
the best interests of children. 
1. Protection of the Marital Family Unit from Outside 
Intrusion 
As discussed above, the most direct method of furthering the 
objective of protecting the marital family unit from outside in-
trusion would be to place a blanket ban on third-party challenges 
to the marital presumption, including challenges from biological 
fathers.217 This may be an appealing option for some states, es-
pecially those that do not currently grant standing to biological 
fathers to rebut the marital presumption.218 The majority of 
states, however, have determined that biological fathers should 
have standing to seek to rebut the marital presumption despite 
the significant potential harm to the marital family unit.219 It is 
important to note, though, that the decision of most states to 
 
 217. See supra Part II.B. 
 218. See supra notes 118–19 and accompanying text. 
 219. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
  
2019] MARITAL PRESUMPTION 291 
 
grant biological fathers standing to rebut the marital presump-
tion reflects the increasing willingness of states to provide men 
with parental rights and duties based upon their biological con-
nection to a child.220 Since the extension of marriage equality to 
same-sex couples likely means that biology can no longer be the 
basis for rebutting the marital presumption, perhaps some of the 
states who currently grant standing to biological fathers will 
reevaluate their approach to this issue.  
It is likely, however, that a number of states that currently 
grant standing to unmarried biological fathers to rebut the mar-
ital presumption will choose to continue to do so despite the fact 
that the lack of biological connection between the child and the 
spouse of the individual who gave birth will no longer be the ba-
sis for rebuttal. Genetic connections have long played an im-
portant role in parentage determinations,221 and some states 
likely will be more resistant than others to denying biological 
parents their day in court. States that continue to grant biologi-
cal parents standing to rebut the presumption, but whose objec-
tives also include protecting the marital family unit from outside 
intrusion, may utilize a number of other measures to further this 
objective. For example, such states could make rebuttal more dif-
ficult by requiring the party seeking rebuttal to prove both a lack 
of mutual intent on behalf of the married couple for the spouse 
of the individual who gave birth to be the child’s parent and a 
lack of functioning as a parent on behalf of the spouse.222 Addi-
tionally, states could adopt standards under which standing for 
third parties would be denied or third-party claims would be re-
jected in situations in which rebuttal would be contrary to the 
best interests of the child or, more broadly, contrary to the best 
interests of the marital family unit. The objective of protecting 
the marital family unit from outside intrusion could also be fur-
thered by adopting time limitations for third-party challenges to 
the marital presumption and limiting the categories of third par-
ties granted standing to rebut the presumption. While these 
methods arguably would not further the purpose of protecting 
the marital family unit from outside intrusion to the same extent 
as an outright ban on third-party challenges, each of these meth-
ods would nonetheless be effective in reducing the number of 
successful third-party challenges to the marital presumption. 
 
 220. Feinberg, supra note 8, at 116–17. 
 221. Id. at 115–23. 
 222. See supra Part III.A.3. 
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However, one significant concern with granting biological 
parents standing to rebut the presumption, even though biology 
will no longer form the basis for rebuttal, is that considerations 
of biological connections for any purpose under marital presump-
tion standards will disproportionately and unjustly harm same-
sex couples. This is because while different-sex couples also may 
utilize third-party genetic materials to conceive, for same-sex 
couples there generally will necessarily be an individual outside 
of the relationship whose genetic materials were used to conceive 
the child.223 This is a significant concern. Even though third-
party actions to rebut the marital presumption would be unsuc-
cessful absent proof of lack of mutual intent and/or parental 
function under the proposed standards discussed above, the abil-
ity of the biological parent to bring the rebuttal action in and of 
itself would result in significant disruption and harm to families 
who have conceived children using donor gametes. Furthermore, 
even if the relevant laws allowed judges to deny standing where 
rebuttal would not be in the best interests of the child, this is not 
sufficient protection for couples who conceive using gamete do-
nors, as best interests standards are incredibly broad and sub-
jective.224 To address this problem, states that include biological 
parents in the category of individuals granted standing to rebut 
the marital presumption must explicitly exclude gamete donors 
from qualifying for such standing. Gamete donors do not have 
any parental rights or obligations under state law to the children 
conceived using their genetic materials and thus it is only logical 
(and fair) that their biological connection to the child could not 
serve as a basis for granting them standing to rebut the marital 
presumption.225  
 
 223. The exception to this would be for same-sex couples wherein one mem-
ber of the couple is transgender. See Coleman, supra note 7. 
 224. See infra notes 235–37 and accompanying text. 
 225. Feinberg, supra note 8, at 121–22. This, however, unfortunately will not 
solve every aspect of the problem. Some states’ donor non-paternity laws require 
that the procedure through which the child is conceived be performed under the 
supervision of a licensed physician. Id. For purposes of the state’s marital pre-
sumption, a gamete provider should be denied standing if it is proven that the 
gametes were provided for use in assisted reproduction with the understanding 
that the donor would have no legal rights or obligations to the child, regardless 
of whether the formal requirements of the state’s donor non-paternity law have 
been satisfied. 
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2. Promotion of Marriage as the Preferred Site of Parentage 
Establishment 
With regard to the objective of promoting marriage as the 
preferred site of parentage establishment, the most direct way 
to further this objective would be to adopt a marital presumption 
that is wholly irrefutable. This approach, which Professor Susan 
Appleton has aptly referred to as the “assumption-of-the-risk ap-
proach” to marriage,226 is unlikely to be adopted by any signifi-
cant number of states, as the vast majority of states have long 
rejected it.227 Under this type of approach, the spouse of the in-
dividual who gave birth would be deemed the child’s legal parent 
against the wishes of the individual who gave birth, the spouse, 
and/or the child even if there was no intent on behalf of the par-
ties for the spouse to be the child’s parent, the spouse never func-
tioned as the child’s parent, and the spouse was not genetically 
connected to the child. The spouse’s marriage to the individual 
who gave birth alone would establish his or her legal parentage, 
and no other considerations would come into play. It is likely 
that many states would find such a singularly-focused approach 
to something as important as the establishment of legal parent-
age to be undesirable. 
States that do not want to go so far as to make the marital 
presumption wholly irrefutable, but whose objectives include 
promoting marriage as the preferred site of parentage establish-
ment, may utilize a number of less direct methods, many of 
which are similar to those that states may utilize to further the 
objective of protecting marriages from outside intrusion. For ex-
ample, making the grounds for rebuttal significantly more diffi-
cult by requiring the party seeking rebuttal to prove both a lack 
of requisite intent and lack of requisite function would have the 
effect of promoting marriage as the preferred site for parentage 
establishment.228 States also could make rebuttal challenges 
more difficult to bring or succeed upon by limiting the categories 
of individuals granted standing to bring rebuttal actions, estab-
lishing time limitations for such actions, and precluding rebuttal 
where it would be contrary to the best interests of the child or 
 
 226. Appleton, supra note 8, at 286 (internal quotations omitted). 
 227. Harris, supra note 26, at 622 (“[T]he conclusive presumption that a 
woman’s husband is the father of her children is all but dead . . . .”); Monopoli, 
supra note 41, at 437 (“Every state has a version of the martial presump-
tion . . . although it is no longer irrebuttable in the vast majority of states . . . .”). 
 228. See supra Part III.A.3. 
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marital family unit.229 In addition, allowing courts to utilize eq-
uitable doctrines to deny rebuttal would also make succeeding 
on such challenges more difficult, particularly for challenges in-
itiated by one of the spouses, thereby furthering the promotion 
of marriage as the preferred site for parentage establishment.230 
3. Furthering Children’s Best Interests 
The most drastic method that states could use to further the 
objective of promoting children’s best interests would be to struc-
ture the marital presumption such that the only consideration 
in rebuttal actions would be the best interests of the child. There 
are, however, a number of significant issues with adopting this 
approach to rebuttal. Under current law, the best interests of the 
child standard is used mainly for determinations of physical and 
legal custody between two individuals who are already entitled 
to recognition as the child’s legal parents; importantly, this 
standard generally has not been used as a basis for denying legal 
parent status to individuals who the law presumes to be par-
ents.231 It also is not the standard used to involuntarily termi-
nate a legal parent’s rights. Instead, such actions are subject to 
a much higher standard of proof by clear and convincing evi-
dence of parental unfitness.232 The best interests analysis does 
not come into play in involuntary termination actions unless the 
parental unfitness standard is satisfied, and even then it serves 
only as a safety net to prevent termination of parental rights 
where it would be contrary to the child’s best interests despite 
the parent’s unfitness.233  
Moreover, as it presently stands, most states that consider 
the best interests of the child in marital presumption challenges 
do so only for limited purposes. More specifically, in most states 
that consider the best interests of the child in marital presump-
tion challenges, analysis of the child’s best interests is used only 
 
 229. See supra Part II.B. 
 230. See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text. 
 231. Jessica Feinberg, Consideration of Genetic Connections in Child Cus-
tody Disputes Between Same-Sex Parents: Fair or Foul?, 81 MO. L. REV. 331, 355 
(2016) (“Every state has adopted some form of the best interests of the child 
standard to govern disputes involving two fit legal parents . . . .”). 
 232. Phillip M. Genty, Procedural Due Process Rights of Incarcerated Par-
ents in Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings: A Fifty State Analysis, 30 
J. FAM. L. 757, 766, 769 (1992). 
 233. 2 ANN M. HARALAMBIE, HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY, ABUSE AND ADOPTION 
CASES §§ 13:3, 13:7 (2018); Feinberg, supra note 231, at 345–46. 
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to preclude rebuttal of the presumption and thereby maintain 
the spouse’s legal parentage (either by denying the admission of 
genetic testing evidence or rejecting rebuttal actions despite ge-
netic testing evidence indicating that the spouse is not the child’s 
genetic parent).234 If rebuttal of the marital presumption could 
occur based solely on a judicial determination that it was in the 
best interests of the child, it would result in a situation in which 
neither the parties to the marriage nor the child could be secure 
in the marital presumption’s provision of legal parentage to the 
spouse who did not give birth. Legal scholars and commentators 
have long criticized the best interests of the child standard as 
unjust and unpredictable due to the largely unfettered discretion 
it provides judges.235 The law generally does not provide judges 
with any direction with regard to how to weigh each of the many 
factors set forth within the best interests of the child standard.236 
Moreover, best interests standards generally allow judges to 
weigh, in addition to the factors provided, any factor that the 
judge deems relevant.237 Overall, a rebuttal standard that fo-
cused only on the judge’s determination of the best interests of 
the child would result in a very weak marital presumption that 
would leave marital families in a state of uncertainty. This, in 
and of itself, seems contrary to the best interests of children. It 
also seems like an undesirable result for states whose marital 
 
 234. See supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text.  
 235. Sarah Abramowicz, Contractualizing Custody, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 67, 
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presumption objectives include protecting marriages from out-
side intrusion or promoting marriage as the preferred site for 
parentage establishment. Furthermore, under a pure best inter-
ests approach to rebuttal, judges would not be required to pro-
vide any deference to the decision-making autonomy of the 
spouses with regard to the structure of their family or to consider 
any spousal expectations or reliance interests. 
An approach that bases rebuttal solely on a best interests 
analysis, rendering the marital presumption significantly 
weaker, would be especially problematic for same-sex couples, 
since the spouse who did not give birth generally would not be 
entitled to parentage on separate genetics-based grounds if the 
marital presumption was rebutted.238 Application of a pure best 
interests standard for rebuttal of the marital presumption would 
open the door for judicial bias against “non-traditional” families. 
Longstanding biases about what it means to be a parent (biolog-
ical connections) or what a family should look like (two different-
sex parents and their children) could factor into judicial analyses 
of whether rebuttal of the marital presumption is in the child’s 
best interests. Extending the marital presumption to same-sex 
couples, while at the same time adopting a standard that allows 
judicial bias and subjectivity to play a central role in its applica-
tion, is both illogical and unjust. 
Fortunately, there are other methods of structuring the 
marital presumption that would effectively advance the objec-
tive of furthering the best interests of children. As discussed 
above, there are strong arguments that providing parentage to 
the spouse of the individual who gave birth when the couple mu-
tually intended for the spouse to be the child’s second parent or 
when the spouse has functioned as a parent to the child gener-
ally serves to further children’s best interests.239 Consequently, 
states could weigh the pros and cons of each approach and deter-
mine whether an intent-based, function-based, or combination 
approach to rebuttal would most effectively advance the objec-
tive of furthering children’s best interests. If a state adheres to 
the view that children’s best interests generally are furthered 
through the establishment of parentage within marriage and/or 
 
 238. Exceptions to this proposition include same-sex couples in which one 
member is transgender as well as female same-sex couples who utilize recipro-
cal in vitro fertilization to conceive (wherein one member of the couple provides 
genetic materials and the other member of the couple carries the pregnancy). 
See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
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the protection of the marital family unit from outside intrusion, 
it may be more inclined to adopt the combination intent- and 
function-based approach, which would make rebuttal more diffi-
cult. Additionally, states could adopt a standard under which re-
buttal was precluded, regardless of satisfaction of the base re-
quirement (lack of intent, function, or both), when it would be 
contrary to the best interests of the child or inequitable. Using 
the best interests standard as a safety net to protect the rela-
tionship between the child and the spouse of the individual who 
gave birth in appropriate circumstances where rebuttal would 
otherwise occur, as opposed to as a method for denying parent-
age to an individual presumed under the law to be the child’s 
parent, would alleviate many of the concerns regarding the po-
tential misuse of the best interests standard described above. 
States also could significantly minimize disruption to children 
and their established families by placing strict time limitations 
on challenges to the marital presumption and limiting the class 
of people granted standing to bring such challenges. 
C. THE OPTIMAL APPROACH TO REBUTTAL  
Along with bestowing legal parent status to spouses who 
have shown a commitment to parentage through intent or func-
tion, most states will likely identify the furtherance of children’s 
best interests and the protection and promotion of the marital 
family unit and its members as primary objectives of the marital 
presumption. If a state does not seek to promote objectives relat-
ing to protecting and promoting the well-being of marriages and 
marital children through its modern marital presumption, then 
there would seem to be little reason for the state to maintain the 
presumption at all. Consequently, for most states that choose to 
maintain the marital presumption, the combination intent- and 
function-based approach to rebuttal, which requires proof of both 
a lack of mutual intent for the spouse of the individual who gave 
birth to be the child’s legal parent and a lack of parental func-
tioning on behalf of the spouse, will be the most effective choice. 
The combination approach will be more effective both in advanc-
ing the best interests of children and in promoting and protect-
ing the marital family unit than approaches that focus on intent 
or function alone. 
In terms of children’s best interests, by limiting rebuttal to 
truly compelling situations where both the requisite intent and 
function are lacking, the combination approach errs on the side 
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of ensuring that, from the time of birth, the vast majority of mar-
ital children will be provided with two legal parents from whom 
to receive care and support. Importantly, there exist significant 
gaps in approaches that focus solely on intent or function. These 
gaps are problematic in terms of the promotion of children’s best 
interests because they may result in the denial of parentage to a 
spouse who has demonstrated a significant parental commit-
ment to the child in question. A combination approach, however, 
fills in many of these problematic gaps. For example, under the 
combination approach, a spouse who has functioned as a child’s 
parent and has formed a parental bond with the child will not be 
denied parentage solely because the requisite mutual intent did 
not exist at the designated point in time. Similarly, in situations 
in which the individual who gave birth and their spouse mutu-
ally intended for the spouse to be the child’s legal parent, the 
spouse will not be denied parentage solely because he or she did 
not yet have the opportunity to function in a parental role to the 
child. Overall, the combination approach promotes children’s 
best interests by providing marital children with a second legal 
parent when the spouse of the individual who gave birth has, in 
any significant way, demonstrated a commitment to parentage. 
In addition, approaches that focus on intent or function 
alone can encourage behavior from married individuals that is 
contrary to children’s best interests and can lead to unfair re-
sults. The combination approach alleviates many of these con-
cerns as well. For example, under the combination approach, 
spouses of individuals who give birth cannot avoid being deemed 
legal parents by simply refusing to conduct themselves in a pa-
rental role and individuals who give birth cannot prevent their 
spouses from receiving legal parentage by simply refusing to al-
low the spouse to function as the child’s parent. Moreover, indi-
viduals who have given birth to a child and who have encouraged 
their spouse to form a parental relationship with the child can-
not sever that relationship, which can be of great importance to 
the child’s well-being, simply by demonstrating a lack of mutual 
intent for the spouse to be the child’s legal parent at a designated 
moment in time. Similarly, under the combination approach, a 
spouse who has assumed the responsibilities of parenthood and 
has formed a parent-like bond with the child could not sever his 
or her legal relationship with the child simply by proving a lack 
of mutual intent for the spouse to be the child’s legal parent at 
some designated point in time. 
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The combination approach also goes further than ap-
proaches that focus solely on intent or function in protecting and 
promoting marital family units. The significantly higher bar for 
rebuttal established by the combination approach likely will dis-
courage the initiation of challenges to the marital presumption, 
either by the parties to the marriage or third parties, when com-
pelling circumstances for rebuttal do not exist. Even when chal-
lenges to the marital presumption are initiated, the combination 
approach makes rebuttal highly unlikely in situations in which 
the parties to the marriage do not wish for rebuttal to occur. It 
would be extremely difficult for a third party to successfully 
prove both a lack of the requisite intent on the part of the mar-
ried couple and a lack of the requisite functioning on behalf of 
the spouse, without the cooperation of at least one of the mem-
bers of the marriage. Even in situations in which one of the par-
ties to the marriage initiated the challenge to the marital pre-
sumption, rebuttal under a standard requiring proof of both lack 
of intent and lack of function would be unlikely in all but the 
most compelling circumstances. Successful rebuttal actions 
likely would be limited, for the most part, to situations involving 
married couples whose marriages were, during the relevant pe-
riod of time, in name only. 
In addition to adopting the combination intent- and func-
tion-based approach to rebuttal, states should further reduce the 
likelihood of disruption to marriages and marital children by 
limiting the circumstances under which individuals can bring 
actions to challenge the marital presumption. Adopting bright-
line time limitations on challenges to the marital presumption, 
an approach already undertaken by many states,240 is undoubt-
edly an effective method of significantly reducing the likelihood 
of disruption to marriages and the lives of marital children. Nar-
rowly defining the class of individuals granted standing to chal-
lenge the presumption will also decrease disruption to marriages 
and marital children. If standing is granted to biological fathers, 
states should amend their standing provisions to expressly ex-
clude from standing individuals who are gamete donors. This 
will be an important component of a modern marital presump-
tion that seeks to protect all marital family units regardless of 
the sex of the spouses, as same-sex couples generally must use 
donor gametes in order to conceive children. Finally, states 
 
 240. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text. 
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should continue to employ principles relating to equity and chil-
dren’s best interests in appropriate situations to maintain legal 
parentage in the spouse of the individual who gave birth despite 
satisfaction of the rebuttal grounds. 
IV.  THE POSSIBILITY OF SEPARATE MARITAL 
PRESUMPTIONS BASED UPON THE METHOD OF 
CONCEPTION   
Another potential option would be for states to apply one of 
the new marital presumption standards discussed above to situ-
ations in which conception occurred through nonsexual means, 
but to continue to apply their current marital presumption 
standards to situations in which conception occurred through 
sexual means. This would mean that the state would have two 
separate marital presumption standards, the applicability of 
which would depend on the category of conception. A new mari-
tal presumption standard that focuses on non-genetics related 
considerations for rebuttal, such as intent and/or function, is ab-
solutely essential for same- and different-sex married couples 
who utilize assisted reproduction to conceive children who are 
not genetically related to the member of the couple who did not 
give birth. Although laws in every state establish parentage for 
a birth mother’s husband who consents to his wife’s use of as-
sisted reproduction with the intent to be the resulting child’s 
parent, and under Obergefell these laws should apply equally to 
same-sex spouses,241 there are varying formal requirements for 
compliance with such laws, including that the spouse provide 
written consent to the procedure,242 that the procedure be per-
formed under the supervision of a physician,243 or that a specific 
type of assisted reproduction procedure be performed.244 Im-
portantly, a marital presumption that requires proving lack of 
mutual intent and/or parental function for rebuttal serves as an 
 
 241. JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 54, § 3.3. 
 242. Id. § 3:7. 
 243. Id. § 3:9. 
 244. Patton v. Vanterpool, 806 S.E.2d 493, 495–97 (Ga. 2017) (holding that 
the state’s assisted reproduction statute, which creates an “irrebuttable pre-
sumption of legitimacy” with respect to “[a]ll children born within wedlock or 
within the usual period of gestation thereafter who have been conceived by 
means of artificial insemination” when both spouses consented to the procedure 
in writing, did not apply in situations in which the child had been conceived via 
in vitro fertilization (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). 
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essential safety net in situations where a married couple con-
ceives via assisted reproduction, and the couple mutually in-
tended for the spouse to be the child’s parent or the spouse func-
tioned as the child’s parent, but the spouse’s parentage cannot 
be established through the state’s assisted reproduction statute 
due to a failure to comply with its formal requirements.245 This 
is especially important for the protection of married same-sex 
couples, who are increasingly utilizing assisted reproduction to 
bring children into their families and generally cannot conceive 
children using the genetic materials of both spouses.246  
It is likely that some states, particularly those that are more 
resistant to disentangling biology from parentage determina-
tions, will determine that their existing marital presumption 
standards should continue to govern situations in which concep-
tion occurs via sexual intercourse. The law has been much more 
resistant to disentangling biological and legal parentage for bio-
logical fathers in situations of sexual conception as compared to 
nonsexual conception. Even as gamete donation non-paternity 
laws have allowed for the voluntary, non-judicial severance of 
biological and legal parentage, these laws have been restricted 
 
 245. See, e.g., Wendy G-M. v. Erin G-M., 985 N.Y.S.2d 845, 853–55 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 2014) (holding that although the parties had not complied with the 
formal requirements of the spousal consent to assisted reproduction statute, the 
marital presumption provided a separate means for establishing the spouse’s 
parentage). 
 246. Dorothy A. Greenfeld & Emre Seli, Assisted Reproduction in Same Sex 
Couples, in PRINCIPLES OF OOCYTE AND EMBRYO DONATION 289, 289 (M.V. 
Sauer ed., 2013) (“Lesbians often achieve parenthood through intrauterine in-
semination or IVF, sometimes with donor egg as well as donor sperm (‘donor 
embryo’), and through ‘reciprocal IVF’ a process where one partner donates eggs 
to the other. Increasing numbers of gay men seek fatherhood through IVF using 
an egg donor and a gestational carrier surrogate.”); Meredith Larson, Don’t 
Know Much About Biology: Courts and the Rights of Non-Biological Parents in 
Same-Sex Partnerships, 11 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 869, 872 (2010) (“In what some 
have termed a ‘gayby boom,’ LGBT couples and individuals are taking ad-
vantage of these [ART] options to have children at an increasing rate.”); Scott 
Titshaw, A Modest Proposal to Deport the Children of Gay Citizens, & Etc.: Im-
migration Law, The Defense of Marriage Act and the Children of Same-Sex Cou-
ples, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 407, 412 (2011) (“Assisted reproductive technology 
(‘ART’) and surrogacy arrangements have become more and more common and 
legally accepted as methods for building families by different-sex and same-sex 
couples.”); FAM. EQUALITY COUNCIL, LGBTQ FAMILY FACT SHEET 1–2 (2017), 
https://www2.census.gov/cac/nac/meetings/2017-11/LGBTQ-families-factsheet 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/R8KT-SBBW] (“Today . . . an increasing number of same-
sex couples are planning and creating their families through assisted reproduc-
tive technology (ART) and surrogacy . . . .”). 
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to situations in which conception occurs without sexual inter-
course. An individual who creates a child via sexual intercourse 
is, by definition, not encompassed within state donor non-pater-
nity laws.247 As Professor Susan Appleton has explained, “[n]ot 
only are sexually conceiving parents unable to bargain away the 
rights of their children, but sexual contracts have traditionally 
been deemed void as against public policy.”248 Stated another 
way, “sexual conception makes a genetic father a legal parent. 
By contrast, nonsexual conception . . . offers opportunities for a 
genetic father to be simply a donor with no parental rights or 
obligations . . . .”249 A number of courts have emphasized the dra-
matically differing legal consequences that may arise for biolog-
ical parents depending on the method of conception, emphasiz-
ing that biological fathers who conceive children via sexual 
intercourse cannot waive their legal parentage regardless of the 
intent or agreement of the parties engaging in intercourse.250 
The resistance to severing biological and legal parentage in the 
context of sexual conception reflects the “personal responsibility” 
 
 247. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-909(e)(2) (2019) (“A donor of semen to a person 
for artificial insemination, other than the donor’s spouse or domestic partner, is 
not a parent of a child thereby conceived unless the donor and the person agree 
in writing that said donor shall be a parent . . . .”(emphasis added)); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 23-2208(f) (2018) (“The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician 
for use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor’s wife is 
treated in law as if he were not the birth father of a child thereby conceived, 
unless agreed to in writing by the donor and the woman.” (emphasis added)). 
 248. Susan Frelich Appleton, Between the Binaries: Exploring the Legal 
Boundaries of Nonanonymous Sperm Donation, 49 FAM. L.Q. 93, 109 (2015).  
 249. Id. at 93–94. 
 250. See, e.g., Straub v. B.M.T., 645 N.E.2d 597, 601 (Ind. 1994) (refusing to 
recognize donor nonpaternity agreement and stating that “there is no such 
thing as ‘artificial insemination by intercourse’”); In re the Matter of Paternity 
of M.F. and C.F., 938 N.E.2d 1256, 1260 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (“[I]f insemination 
occurred via intercourse, the Donor Agreement would be unenforceable as 
against public policy.”); Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 1246 (Pa. 2007) 
(distinguishing between sexual and nonsexual conception, and stating that “[i]n 
the case of traditional sexual reproduction, there simply is no question that the 
parties to any resultant conception and birth may not contract between them-
selves to deny the child the support he or she requires”); Kesler v. Weniger, 744 
A.2d 794, 796 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (“[W]e decline to recognize a category of 
‘artificial insemination by intercourse.’”). 
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approach to sexual conduct and the fear that something as im-
portant as the waiver of parental rights could occur too casually 
if allowed in the context of sexual intercourse.251 
Applying differing marital presumptions based upon the 
method of conception likely would mean that the state would 
simply continue to apply its existing marital presumption, with-
out any significant changes, in situations involving sexual con-
ception without regard to whether the spouses are of the same- 
or different-sex. Consequently, genetics-based considerations 
would continue to play a core role in rebuttal of the marital pre-
sumption in situations where the individual who gave birth to 
the child conceived the child via sexual intercourse with someone 
other than their spouse, regardless of the sex of the spouse. If a 
state chose to continue using its existing marital presumption 
standard for situations in which conception occurred via sexual 
intercourse, the state’s existing rules regarding the ability to 
preclude rebuttal despite the spouse’s lack of genetic ties to the 
child based upon the child’s best interests or equitable principles 
would also continue to govern, as would the existing rules re-
garding standing and time limitations for challenges.  
The adoption of differing rules governing the presumption 
of parentage for the spouse of the individual who gave birth 
based upon whether conception occurred through sexual or non-
sexual means would not be unprecedented.252 Under Quebec’s 
parentage law, for example, when a married couple has engaged 
in a “parental project” to conceive a child through assisted pro-
creation using third-party donor gametes, the spouse of the per-
son who gives birth to the child is presumed to be the child’s legal 
parent.253 Although for purposes of this presumption assisted 
procreation using third-party donor gametes can occur via sex-
ual or nonsexual means,254 when assisted procreation occurs via 
nonsexual means rebuttal of the presumption cannot be based 
 
 251. Appleton, supra note 248, at 109; Deborah L. Forman, Exploring the 
Boundaries of Families Created with Known Sperm Providers: Who’s In and 
Who’s Out?, 19 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 41, 92 n.329 (2016). 
 252. The 2017 Uniform Parentage Act deviates from its general rules for re-
buttal of the marital presumption in certain circumstances involving concep-
tions that occur via assisted reproduction. For example, the Act provides a sep-
arate standard for rebuttal of the marital presumption for situations in which 
conception occurs via assisted reproduction and the birth mother’s spouse seeks 
to rebut his or her own presumed parentage. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 705 
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 253. Civil Code of Québec, R.S.Q., c CCQ-1991, art. 538.3 (Can.). 
 254. Id. arts. 538.2, 538.3. 
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upon the gamete provider’s genetic tie to the child.255 Instead, 
rebuttal in the context of nonsexual assisted procreation can oc-
cur only if “there was no mutual parental project or if it is estab-
lished that the child was not born of the assisted procreation.”256 
When assisted procreation occurs via sexual means, however, 
the gamete provider may establish legal parentage during the 
first year of the child’s life based upon his genetic tie to the 
child.257 The establishment of legal parentage in the gamete pro-
vider results in the denial of legal parentage to the spouse of the 
individual who gave birth.258 
There are a number of considerations to weigh in determin-
ing whether to adopt an approach that applies differing marital 
presumptions to sexual and nonsexual conceptions. Those who 
believe that to promote fairness and children’s well-being, par-
entage law should move away from its focus on biology and to-
ward intent- and/or function-based focuses, would likely lament 
the failure to take advantage of a key opportunity to disentangle 
legal and biological parentage.259 After all, many people would 
argue that “the particular means of conception has no inherent 
connection to a child’s affective ties or need for support—or, for 
that matter, to an adult’s intent or family bonds.”260 In states 
that have moved or wish to move toward parentage establish-
ment standards that place primary importance on intent or func-
tion as opposed to biology, a singular marital presumption stand-
ard that is based on non-genetic considerations will be the most 
desirable. This is not to say, however, that having separate mar-
ital presumptions would not also contribute to the further legal 
 
 255. Id. arts. 538.2, 539. 
 256. Id. art. 539. 
 257. Id. art. 538.2. 
 258. Id.; Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own 
Child: Parentage Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury, 5 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 201, 228 (2009) (stating that under 
Quebec’s parentage law, when assisted procreation occurs via sexual means, 
“[t]he biological mother’s same-sex partner can declare herself a parent when 
the child is born, but if the biological father seeks parentage during the child’s 
first year he will simultaneously eliminate the partner’s legal bond to the child. 
The statute does not permit three persons—the mother, her partner, and the 
biological father—to be recognized as a child’s parents.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 259. NeJaime, supra note 74, at 1249 (“Family law developments over the 
past several decades, culminating in many ways in the Court’s recognition of 
marriage equality in Obergefell, point toward results in both the same-sex and 
different-sex contexts that value functional and intentional parenthood over bi-
ological and genetic connections.”). 
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disentanglement of biological and legal parentage—a marital 
presumption that removes genetics-based considerations from 
rebuttal, even if it only applied when conception occurred via 
nonsexual means, would also contribute to this goal—it would 
just do so to a lesser degree. It is also important to note that 
adopting separate marital presumptions based upon the method 
of conception will seem like a much less drastic step for states 
that, even as they have increasingly recognized the rights of non-
genetic parents in the assisted reproduction context, have other-
wise maintained genetics as the core consideration for parentage 
determinations. 
Another consideration is whether removing genetics-based 
considerations from application of the marital presumption only 
in situations of nonsexual conception would work an injustice on 
same-sex couples. The argument that such an injustice would 
occur is based on the notion that married same-sex couples dis-
proportionately need to obtain genetic materials from someone 
outside of the marriage in order to conceive. Because some forms 
of assisted reproduction can be very expensive, while sexual in-
tercourse is not, requiring conception using an outsider’s gam-
etes to occur via nonsexual means in order to enjoy a marital 
presumption that does not base rebuttal on genetic ties is unfair 
and harmful to same-sex couples, especially those who are low-
income.261 There is no doubt that the inaccessibility of assisted 
reproductive technology for low-income individuals is a serious 
problem in the United States.262 However, the distinction be-
tween the two marital presumption standards would be based on 
sexual versus nonsexual conception as opposed to the use of spec-
ified assisted reproduction technologies or lack thereof, and 
there are methods of non-sexual conception that are not costly 
and do not require medical expertise.263 
It is possible that having separate marital presumptions 
may actually be beneficial to same-sex couples in some states. As 
 
 261. Alexandra Sifferlin, Millions of Women Don’t Have Access to Fertility 
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discussed above, if a single marital presumption was used, it is 
likely that some states that currently grant biological fathers 
standing to challenge the presumption would continue to do so, 
even though the grounds for rebuttal would no longer be based 
on genetic ties. However, if a state in this category adopted a 
separate marital presumption standard for conceptions by non-
sexual means, it may be significantly more likely to structure 
that standard to exclude biological fathers from the category of 
individuals granted standing or to place on such individuals the 
burden of proving that they were not gamete donors in order to 
obtain standing. From the state’s perspective, in the context of 
nonsexual conception involving an individual married to some-
one other than the sperm provider, it may be significantly more 
likely that the sperm was obtained with the mutual understand-
ing that the provider would have no rights and obligations to the 
child, and that the individual to whom the sperm was provided 
and their spouse would be the child’s parents. Also, the personal 
responsibility approach to sexual intercourse and the fear that 
parental rights could be waived too casually in the context of sex-
ual intercourse would not be considerations in the context of non-
sexual conceptions.  
Overall, the decision regarding whether to create one uni-
form marital presumption or two distinct marital presumptions 
based upon the method of conception will likely hinge on the 
state’s willingness, or lack thereof, to move beyond genetics-re-
lated considerations in parentage determinations. States that 
choose to adopt differing marital presumptions based upon the 
method of conception and maintain genetic connections as a core 
consideration in rebuttal for conceptions that occur through sex-
ual means should, if they have not already, adopt standards that 
permit courts to reject genetics-based rebuttal in situations in 
which the child’s best interests or equitable considerations sup-
port maintaining the spouse’s legal parentage and place time 
limitations on rebuttal actions. This will help to ensure that, alt-
hough genetic connections will continue to be an important con-
sideration in rebuttal actions involving conceptions by sexual 
means, genetic connections will not automatically trump other 
important considerations, such as the best interests of the child.  
CONCLUSION 
In the near future, many states will address the question of 
how to restructure the marital presumption of parentage to log-
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ically and effectively encompass same-sex couples. As this Arti-
cle has detailed, states will have a number of options to choose 
from in structuring the details of their new marital presump-
tions of parentage. Each approach has strengths and weak-
nesses, and the approach that each state will ultimately choose 
to adopt will depend on the objectives that the state seeks to fur-
ther through the marital presumption. Importantly, the exten-
sion of the marital presumption of parentage to same-sex couples 
will have the powerful effect of requiring states to reconceive the 
purpose of the presumption as something beyond identifying the 
individual most likely to be the child’s second genetic parent. 
This reconceptualization will occur during a time when the wis-
dom of the law’s historical reliance on genetics-related consider-
ations in determining parentage is being called into question and 
states increasingly are placing importance on considerations 
such as intent and function in making parentage determina-
tions. The restructuring of states’ marital presumptions of par-
entage, which will require every state to undertake a reevalua-
tion of what considerations are most important in identifying the 
individuals entitled to recognition as a child’s legal parents, 
likely will play a critical role in the modern development of the 
law governing the establishment of parentage. 
 
